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Abstract
To date, there is little research on the phenomena of 
decisional regret. Most of the literature contains 
speculation about the antecedents, moderators, processes 
and consequences of regret rather than offering 
empirical evidence. This study looked at temporary 
affective states and the moderating effect of the 
valence of additional information in terms of the amount 
of post-decisional regret experienced, confidence 
levels, ratings of decision alternatives and subsequent 
choice. A 2 X 2 factorial design was used to examine 
the influence of affective state (positive vs neutral) 
and the valence of additional information (neutral vs 
negative) on regret and the evaluation of decision 
alternatives. Results demonstrate a significant 
interaction of affect and additional information on the 
second decision task rating of the initially chosen 
alternative. Valence of additional information also had 
significant effects on the alternative choice and most 
of the alternative ratings. Affect, on the other hand, 
did not significantly affect any of the dependent 
variables. Future research can build on this and 
explore better measurement methods to more clearly 
ascertain the effects of the valence of additional 
information on regret and decision evaluation.
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The Influence of Valence of Additional Information 
and Affective State on Regret and Subsequent 
Decision Making Behavior 
Decision making in an organizational setting is a 
major determinant of that company's success or failure 
(Hickson, 1987) . Board members, executives, upper and 
lower level management, and their subordinates are 
frequently faced with important decisions that could 
potentially affect the organization's productivity and, 
ultimately, its survival.
Research on decision making in organizations tends 
to focus on single decision making tasks or "one-shot" 
decisions. Despite the enormous body of research in 
the area of decision making, most of the studies have 
been concerned with predicting decision processes, 
strategies and final choices (for review, see Bell, 
1983, 1985; Brehm & Wilklund, 1970; Cohen & Jaffray, 
1988; Dahlback, 1990; Einhorn & Hogarth, 1981; Fagley & 
Miller, 1987; Johnson, 1986; Kahneman, 1991; Kahneman, 
Slovic & Tversky, 1982; Keeney & Raiffa, 1976; Lindzey 
& Aronson, 1985; Payne, Bettman, Johnson, 1992; Pitz & 
Sachs, 1984; Schoemaker, 1982; Wilson & Schooler, 1991; 
Wofford & Goodwin, 1990) or group decision making 
(Miller, Shain & Pasta, 1991a, 1991b) rather than 
individual decision making. One exception to the "one-
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shot" studies in decision making is a study done by 
Walster (1964). Walster's subjects rated ten jobs in 
a decision task. They believed they would be assigned 
to one of these jobs for the next two years. Subjects 
were then told that two of the jobs had been selected 
for them to choose between. Both jobs had been rated 
previously as only being moderately desirable to the 
subjects. After the subjects chose which one of the 
two jobs they preferred, Walster again had them rate 
all ten positions. She was interested in the second 
decision task and how the subjects rated these jobs 
after being told they were assigned to one. She found 
that past decisions did indeed affect future decision 
making tasks.
The fact that decisions affect subsequent 
decisions is very important. As individuals make 
decisions and experience their outcomes, they learn 
from their successes and failures and subsequently 
choose to alter or not to alter their future decision 
making processes. These past decisions, as well as the 
many other variables that influence decisions, are ever 
present when faced with a decision task.
Anderson (1983), along with many other researchers, 
state that organizational decision making is more 
complex than it seems. Decision making in
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organizations not only necessitates the use of 
cognitive information processing but it also requires 
social information processing. The decision maker 
receives information regarding decision alternatives 
and consequences from others who also have the ability 
to influence his or her ultimate choice.
In reality, decision making does not occur in an 
emotional vacuum, and yet the research often treats it 
as such. Decision making research needs to focus more 
attention on the effects of decision making activities 
and outcomes on decision makers' emotional states and 
their subsequent decision choices and strategies.
There are a few exceptions in the research in which 
decision outcomes are studied and found to affect 
subsequent decision choices and strategies such as 
psychological entrapment research {Strube, 1988;
Strube, Deichmann & Kickham, 1989), sunk cost research 
(Garland, 1990; Garland & Newport, 1991; Garland, 
Sandefur & Rogers, 19 90; Simonson & Nye, 19 92) and 
escalation of commitment research (Brockner, 1992; 
Garland, Sandefur & Rogers, 1990; Schoorman, Bobko & 
Rentsch, 1991). Still, we need to broaden our 
knowledge of decision making and investigate its 
affective aspects, both before and after the decision 
making task.
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Janis and Mann (1977a) were two pioneer 
researchers in the area of cognitive processing who 
included an affective component in cognitive decision 
making. Other researchers had ideas similar to those 
of Janis and Mann but, unfortunately, these ideas were 
not studied further (Epstein & Clark, 1970; Janis, 
Lumsdaine, & Gladstone, 1951; Staub & Kellett, 1972).
It is important to realize that there are many 
different variables, besides cognitive processes, that 
could potentially influence the decision making 
process. One of these variables is the decisional 
regret felt by the decision maker. In the next section 
I will discuss the construct of decisional regret in 
more detail.
Decisional Regret Defined
A precise definition of regret is difficult to 
find. Bell's (1985) definition of regret states that 
it is the psychological reaction one has after having 
made a wrong decision, with wrongness being based on 
the outcomes of that decision rather than the adequacy 
of the decision processes. Sugden (1985) states that 
regret occurs when "what is" does not match up to "what 
might have been." He states that regret requires an 
individual to believe that he or she is to blame for 
the decision error, and the regret experienced is a
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function of the amount of blame the individual places 
upon him or herself. Somewhat in the same vein, Yates 
(1990) asserts that regret occurs when an individual 
assesses alternatives to an action already taken and 
finds that one of these alternatives would have led to 
better outcomes. Janis & Mann (1977a) state that 
regret occurs when "bolstering and other defensive 
avoidance tactics no longer succeed in preventing acute 
post-decisional conflict" (pg 310). When these 
attempts to reduce the feelings of regret fail, the 
individual may attempt to reverse the error by blindly 
rushing into a course of action that is directly the 
opposite of the previous choice. Another definition 
of regret is offered by Festinger (1964). His 
definition of regret, which is consistent with, but 
more general than the ideas of Kurt Lewin (1951), is 
explained a bit differently than those previously. He 
states that regret occurs during the process of 
"spreading." Spreading is defined as the process of 
convincing oneself that the attributes of a chosen 
alternative are more attractive than those of an 
alternative that was rejected. The process of 
spreading allows dissonance reduction to occur. 
Festinger postulates that, during the process of 
dissonance reduction, an individual will focus his or
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her attention on the dissonance inducing variables in 
order to find ways of justifying the decision. During 
this process, though, the individual will also be 
exposed to negative qualities of the chosen alternative 
and positive qualities of the rejected alternative. 
Festinger believes that the individual will, at some 
point, wish that he or she had chosen the competing 
alternative. This is what he terms "regret." Finally, 
Epstein, Lipson, Holstein and Huh (1992) define regret 
as the "result of post-outcome processing of 
information and imagining counterfactual alternatives," 
(p. 337) which they define as alternative decision 
possibilities that were not chosen.
One problem with these definitions of regret is 
the tendency to exclusively view regret as an outcome 
occurring after a decision is made. Paradoxically, 
many decision making scholars have viewed regret as a 
predecisional consideration. For example, Yates (1990, 
p. 360) states that the decision makers' representation 
of a decision situation and their subsequent processing 
of alternatives may "take into account potential regret 
from the available alternatives." Bell (1982, 1985) 
and Loomes and Sugden (1982) claim that "anticipated 
regret" is a common element of decision makers' 
representations of alternatives and thus influences
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their choices.
Further complicating the definitional issue is 
that post-decisional regret, or regret as an outcome, 
may be the factor causing anticipated regret in a 
subsequent similar decision task. Alternatively, it is 
possible that anticipated regret could occur 
independently of the decision maker having any prior 
negative experience with a similar type of decision.
A third problem inherent in the above definitions 
is the failure to distinguish what regret is, 
independent of its antecedents. One possible 
definition excluding the antecedents is that regret is 
the cognition or thought that an unchosen alternative 
would have been superior to a chosen alternative 
(Festinger, 1964). However, this interpretation 
totally ignores the emotional aspect of regret.
At the other extreme there is the possibility that 
regret is a negative emotional reaction or a negative 
affective state that happens to result from the post- 
decisional preference for an unchosen alternative. A 
similar type of definition was offered by Janis & Mann 
(1977a) but given a different name. They termed their 
definition 1 spontaneous regret." They state that 
"spontaneous regret" is an internal, completely 
emotional reaction that may overtake an individual
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inadvertently simply by the mention of some "reminder" 
of a loss. However, this affective definition denies 
the cognitive component of regret, relegating it to the 
role of an antecedent.
A third viewpoint is represented by Landman 
(1987a, 1993), who states that regret is associated 
with a set of negative emotional characteristics 
requiring more cognitive assessment and elaboration of 
an event than other negative emotions such as fear and 
anger. Landman's interpretation is a hybrid of the two 
above definitions in that she defines regret as an 
emotion possessing a heavy cognitive component. This 
is congruent with classic theories of emotion (e.g., 
Schachter, 1964) which have long acknowledged that 
cognition is integral to the experience of emotion.
Similar to, but more specific than Landman's 
interpretation of regret, was a definition recently 
offered by Scherer and Stutzman (1994) which will be 
used for purposes of this research. Scherer and 
Stutzman (1994) argue that regret is a psychological 
state characterized by both negative affectivity and 
the cognition that an unchosen alternative may have 
been preferable to the chosen alternative. The 
affective components of decisional regret are proposed 
to vary in quality, intensity and duration. Negative
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affectivity could include depression, frustration, 
anger, or disappointment and its intensity could range 
from mild to strong affective reactions. Its duration 
could be fleeting to long lasting. The cognition 
associated with regret can be placed on a continuum of 
definitiveness regarding the superiority of an unchosen 
alternative. That is, the cognition could range from 
an acknowledgment that an unchosen alternative may have 
been preferable to the definitive conclusion that an 
unchosen alternative should have been chosen. Scherer 
and Stutzman also constrain their conceptualization of 
regret to a specific decision that is irrevocable. If 
this decisional regret is a consequence of a decision 
that was already made, it is termed post-decisional 
regret. If, on the other hand, it is an antecedent of 
a decision that is to be made, it is termed anticipated 
decisional regret.
Antecedents of Decisional Regret
There is no single cause of regret; it appears to 
be multiply determined. Below I will outline a few 
possible causes of such decisional regret.
Age, negative attitudes and the future. According 
to Miller, Shain, and Pasta (1990, 1991a, 1991b), there
is no single cause of regret; instead, they found 
various predictors of regret. These researchers
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studied regret among individual members of couples that
had had either tubal sterilization or a vasectomy.
Through interviews conducted annually for two to five 
years, they found post-sterilization regret to be 
related to many different variables including: 
relatively young age at the time of sterilization, 
ambivalence about future childbearing, and negative 
attitudes toward sterilization (Miller, Shain, & Pasta, 
1991b). These variables affected the individual 
decision makers such that if one member of the couple
had one of the above characteristics, that member was
more likely to experience post-sterilization regret 
than the other member.
Decision conflict. Payne, Bettman, and Johnson 
(1992) state that in decision tasks it is often the 
case that two alternatives are similar. That is, all 
alternatives to a decision are often comprised of 
both positive and negative features and no one 
alternative best meets all of the objectives. When 
choosing between these alternatives, the individual 
will feel conflict when attempting to select the best 
of the two. After the choice is made and the outcome 
becomes salient to the decision maker, he or she may 
experience decisional regret if the outcome is not 
favorable.
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If the outcome due to the chosen alternative is far 
worse than the decision maker believes the outcome 
would have been had the other alternative been chosen, 
that individual will experience extreme regret (Sugden, 
1985). Drawing from the above research, it seems 
likely that the more conflict an individual experiences 
when making a decision, the more regret that person 
will experience if the chosen alternative has a 
negative outcome. If the intensity of the feeling of 
regret is very high, future processing of information, 
decision processes, and behavior will be altered. If, 
on the other hand, the intensity of the feeling of 
regret is very low, the impact on the individual may 
also be low. He or she may choose to ignore the 
processes leading up to the consequences and "chalk it 
up to experience."
Weighting of decision dimensions. A study by 
Billings and Scherer (1991) suggests that post- 
decisional regret may be experienced by decision makers 
who place too much weight on one dimension or category 
of information when evaluating a set of decision 
alternatives. In this study, subjects examined various 
categories of information (e.g. salary, travel 
advancement opportunities) for different jobs and then 
chose which job they would prefer to accept. Across
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the four sets of jobs and the corresponding four 
choices, most subjects examined every available piece 
of information for each job. After completing the 
task, all information for the jobs and the choices they 
made were displayed in matrix format for the subjects 
to review. The subjects were then asked to indicate 
their satisfaction with and regret over each of their 
four job choices and whether they would choose a 
different job within any of the decision sets. Results 
demonstrated that subjects who changed their decisions 
tended to replace their original job choices with 
lower-paying jobs having other amenities. These 
subjects reported more regret and less satisfaction 
with their original choices. Further examination of 
the data indicated that these subjects heavily weighted 
salary information in arriving at their original job 
choices. The authors suggested that undesirable 
decision outcomes and decisional regret may be more 
likely when decision makers place too much weight on 
one dimension of information in evaluating and choosing 
among alternatives. Again, these subjects evaluated 
all of the dimensions of the alternatives available to 
them but weighted one dimension more heavily than the 
other dimensions. It is possible that, at times, 
individuals may skip over some of the information that
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is available to them when presented with a decision 
task. This too can lead to poor decisions and. 
subsequently, post-decisional regret.
Failing to access all available information. It 
is possible that when faced with a decision, although 
all the pertinent information needed to optimize the 
decision is available, the decision maker may choose to 
ignore some of this information. In some situations, 
it may seem more efficient to skip some of the 
available information regarding a decision in order to 
expedite the decision process. Individuals may find 
that if they examine most of the information, they will 
have a good understanding of the problem and be able to 
make a suitable decision. Often times, though, it is 
pertinent that all the information be examined when 
dealing with a problem. If it so happens that the one 
piece of information that was skipped in order to 
expedite the decision process is a vital piece of 
information that would have caused the decision maker 
to choose a different decision alternative, that 
individual will experience decisional regret.
Lack of access to all pertinent information. In 
many organizational decision tasks, all the pertinent 
information is not always available before a decision 
needs to be made. When this occurs, the potential for
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an undesirable outcome is always present. Thus, the 
potential for the decision maker to both anticipate and 
experience decisional regret, both before and after the 
decision, is also always present. Although the 
decision maker knows that the information was not 
available at the time of the decision, he or she may 
also feel some self-doubt that will make it seem that a 
correct decision was still possible, if not obvious. 
When one is confronted with all the information, it is 
very easy to feel that the information that was not 
available at the time of the decision could have been 
easily deduced, if not retrieved. Although there is 
no empirical research regarding exposure to negatively 
valenced additional information that was not available 
prior to the decision leading to decisional regret, it 
seems to be a logical assumption. Although the 
decision maker was not aware of this additional 
information when making the decision, he or she will 
still feel as though, had the information been 
available, a better decision could have been made. The 
decision maker will feel as though he or she has failed 
and, regardless of whether or not that person is at 
fault, he or she will experience reqret.
Again, decisional regret can be caused by a number 
of different variables leading to the decision. These
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antecedents could include, but are not limited to, 
conflicting decision alternatives, the weighting of 
decision dimensions, failing to assess all the 
available information regarding the alternatives, or 
not having access to all the pertinent information 
regarding the alternatives. All of the above may be 
causes of regret which, in turn, hold consequences for 
the decision maker.
Consequences of Decisional Regret
It is difficult to completely divorce the 
discussion of the antecedents of decisional regret from 
its consequences, because consequences of regret may be 
expected to vary as a function of what factors gave 
rise to it. However, it is plausible that 
characteristics of the decision maker, the decision 
task and the situation could also influence the 
consequences of decisional regret.
Most past research was conducted using 
hypothetical scenarios in which regret was measured by 
asking subjects to read a vignette and choose which 
actor they believed would feel more regret for his or 
her actions. An example of one of these vignettes 
follows:
Ms. Smith and Ms, Jones were scheduled to leave 
the airport at the same time, but on different 
flights, to attend important business meetings. 
Each of them drove the same distance to the
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airport, was caught in a traffic jam, and 
arrived at the airport 3 0 minutes after their 
flights were scheduled to depart. Ms. Smith 
was told at her gate that her flight left on 
time. Ms. Jones was told at her gate that her 
flight was delayed and had just left three 
minutes prior. They both had dawdled for ten 
minutes before leaving home. Which one of the 
two felt more regretful for her actions?
(Adapted from Kahneman & Tversky, 1982).
This type of vignette can tell researchers what 
subjects believe a hypothetical other is feeling 
regarding an action. This approach does not explain 
how individuals themselves would react; rather, it 
represents perceptions of how someone else might feel.
Walster (1964) was one of the only researchers to 
empirically test the decisional consequences of regret. 
She asked subjects to rate ten jobs. She then told 
them that they would be assigned to one of two 
specified jobs for the next ten years. She then had 
subjects re-rate the ten jobs again. Walster measured 
the changes in ratings as regret. She found that 
ratings changed after the receipt of future job 
information.
Emotional consequences of regret. Janis and Mann 
(1977a) propose that post-decisional regret can lead to 
feelings of remorse, self-doubt or lack of confidence, 
feelings of weakness, foolishness and depression. This 
is, though, speculation on their part as they do not 
support this statement with empirical evidence. They
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do, however, use this statement to explain the measures 
that people use to decrease these feelings of remorse, 
self-doubt, depression, etc. that are associated with 
regret. They postulate that people, when feeling the 
emotional effects of regret, will attempt to shift the 
responsibility, or use bolstering or procrastination 
defenses, for example, in order to put an end to "the 
acute emotional shock of the disruptive crisis" (Janis 
& Mann, 1977a, p. 312).
Regret-minimizing decision behavior. Decisional 
regret may lead to alterations in an individual's 
normal decision making processes in subsequent decision 
tasks. One potential alteration may be the explicit 
consideration of and avoidance of regret in subsequent 
decision tasks. That is, decision makers who 
experience regret may be more likely to anticipate 
regret and attempt to avoid it in future decisions. 
Regret avoidance may lead to good or poor choices, 
depending on the intensity of the need to avoid 
feelings of regret and the characteristics of the 
decision context, the decision task and the decision 
maker. A study by Josephs, Larrick, Steele and Nisbett 
(1992) provides evidence that characteristics of the 
decision maker as well as the task interact to 
influence the degree of regret-minimizing behavior.
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The researchers conducted three experiments to test 
whether or not subjects' motive to protect self-esteem 
from the threat of regret would affect their decisions. 
Threat of regret was induced by telling subjects that 
they would receive feedback about their decision. 
Control subjects were told they would not receive 
feedback about their decision. The researchers found 
that subjects who had low self-esteem made regret- 
minimizing choices when they expected feedback about 
their decision as opposed to subjects who did not have 
low self-esteem. The second study showed that when 
subjects did not expect to receive feedback about their 
decision, there was no difference in decision 
strategies between high and low self-esteem. In the 
third study, the researchers manipulated the amount of 
feedback the subjects expected to receive. They found 
that as the amount of feedback expected increased, 
regret minimizing choices also increased in the low 
self-esteem subjects but not in the high self-esteem 
subjects. This study suggests that not only is 
objective information utilized in decision making, but 
also the perceived consequences to self-esteem from 
poor decisions especially for those individuals with 
low self-esteem.
Irrational choices. Bell (1982) asserts that
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irrational choices, or choices violating expected 
utility maxims, are a function of regret. In the 
gambling paradigm used by Bell, anticipated regret is 
taken into account by decision makers contemplating 
pairs of gambles causing them to make choices which 
violate expected utility. According to the expected 
utility prediction of assets alone, people given a 
choice between two gambles, with one alternative having 
a 10% chance of $5 million, an 89% chance of $1 
million, and 1% chance of nothing and the other 
guaranteeing a $1 million dollar payoff, subjects 
should choose the gamble that gives them a 10% chance 
of $5 million dollars. However, Bell (1982) found that 
subjects actually chose the "$1 million dollars for 
sure." He explains that if the person chooses the 
other gamble and the 1% chance of winning nothing 
occurs, that person will be devastated. Therefore, 
although the expected utility theory of assets alone 
predicts that subjects will choose the first gamble of 
a 10% chance of $5 million, subjects will actually 
choose the $1 million for sure option in order to avoid 
the possibility of experiencing extreme regret.
The problem with Bell's study is his post-hoc use 
of regret to explain choice behavior. He does not 
present empirical evidence for this claim. Lee (1971)
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and Sugden (1985) also claim that anticipated regret 
causes irrational choice behavior, but they do not 
support this claim with empirical evidence either.
Regret and dissonance reduction. Another probable 
consequence of regret is dissonance reduction.
According to Festinger's (1957) theory of cognitive 
dissonance, when individuals experience tension or 
dissonance because two thoughts or beliefs are 
psychologically inconsistent, they will attempt to 
adjust their way of thinking in order to decrease their 
tension. In decision making, when the decision maker 
learns that a decision has led to an undesirable 
outcome, he or she will attempt to reduce the feelings 
of dissonance which arise from the conflict that was 
previously experienced when attempting to choose 
between decision alternatives. Festinger postulates 
that as the amount of conflict (the difficulty in 
making the decision) before a decision increases, the 
greater the dissonance after the decision.
Festinger's theory of cognitive dissonance was 
tested by Festinger and Carlsmith in 1959. These 
researchers had subjects perform a boring task for an 
hour (turning wooden knobs) and then asked them to tell 
the next subject (a confederate) waiting to do the 
experiment that the experiment was fun and exciting.
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The researchers either paid the subjects $1.00 or 
$20.00 for their assistance. When the subjects told 
the confederate that the task was exciting, the 
confederate in turn told the subject that he or she 
heard from a friend that this was actually a very 
boring task. The subject, who had promised to be 
convincing, explained that he or she really did enjoy 
the task. As the subjects left the building, another 
confederate asked the subjects how they enjoyed the 
experiment in which they had participated (the subjects 
were told that this individual was doing a survey for 
the psychology department on student reactions to 
experiments). Results demonstrated that the subjects 
that were paid $1.00 expressed greater enjoyment of the 
experiment than those who were paid $20.00. The 
authors concluded that the subjects that were paid 
$1.00 experienced greater cognitive dissonance because 
they did not have a justifiable reason to lie to the 
previous confederate. In contrast, the subjects that 
were paid $20.00 did not experience as much cognitive 
dissonance as they had justifiable reason to lie (they 
were paid well).
Festinger (1964) later postulated that before 
engaging in cognitive dissonance reduction, individuals 
will focus their attention on the unfavorable qualities
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of the chosen alternative and the favorable qualities 
of the unchosen alternative. At some point between 
the decision and subsequent dissonance reduction, these 
individuals will tend to prefer the unchosen 
alternative. At this point, the individual experiences 
regret. Walster (1964) tested Festinger's (1964) idea 
of regret occurring during the dissonance reduction 
processes.
Walster (1964) used subjects that had just been 
drafted into the Army and had them rate a number of 
different work assignments on a scale asking "How much 
would you like to work at this job in the Army for the 
next two years?" Walster told the subjects that they 
would be assigned to one of the ten rated jobs for the 
next two years, so they should be as accurate in their 
ratings as possible. Each of the jobs had both 
positive and negative features. After the subjects had 
rated all the jobs, Walster sent them to another room 
to fill out a background information questionnaire.
She then selected two of the previously rated jobs to 
offer the subjects. Jobs were chosen carefully to 
ensure that they had both been previously rated as 
moderately desirable by the subjects. She then told 
the subjects that these two jobs seemed to be best 
suited to them based on their past experience,
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background information, current needs of the army, and 
the subject's previous preference ratings. After 
subjects chose which one of the two jobs they wanted, 
Walster again had them rate all ten positions. She 
manipulated the time between the choice of position and 
the second rating. She found that decisional regret 
was more prominent at four minutes after receiving 
information about their assignment; however, after 
fifteen minutes, cognitive dissonance reduction 
occurred.
The efficacy of dissonance reduction in wiping out 
regret, especially when subsequently faced with a 
similar decision, remains unclear. It is possible that 
the decision situation may dictate the amount of 
dissonance reduction experienced. If the decision and 
its subsequent consequences are very important to the 
decision maker, decisional regret may not be wiped out 
by dissonance reduction. In fact, the regret may 
linger longer and affect subsequent, similar decisions. 
It is also unclear from the cognitive dissonance 
research whether even successful dissonance reduction 
completely replaces regret or merely reduces it. 
Moreover, lingering memory of past regret with or 
without some reduction of dissonance may produce 
attempts to avoid such feelings again, such that
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decision makers utilize different decision strategies 
for making the decision at hand. This could also be 
the case in situations in which the decision maker 
makes a sound choice which is accompanied by a bad 
outcome. The feeling of regret may occur from the one 
bad outcome even though the decision maker knows that 
logically he or she made a good choice.
Alterations in subsequent decision strategies. 
Regret may encourage decision makers to be more 
systematic in their information searches before making 
future decisions. They may scrutinize more carefully 
both the kind of information they choose to 
investigate, from whom they receive their information, 
and how they weight the various pieces of information 
given them. A common assumption in the decision making 
literature is that thorough information processing 
leads to superior decisions (e.g. Beach & Mitchell, 
1978; Abelson & Levi, 1985). On the other hand, regret 
may lead to a hypervigilant search of information that 
may have negative consequences. A decision maker who 
previously made a hasty decision without looking at all 
the facts may, in the future, go to the other extreme. 
This may cause an increase in the amount of time needed 
to reach a decision. Another possibility is that the 
increased information load may cause an increased use
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of heuristics and shortcuts in processing the 
information. Third, regret-induced information 
gathering may be associated with a decreased ability or 
motivation to discriminate among the quality or 
relevance of the information collected prior to making 
a decision.
Negative self-perceptions and failure to make 
optimal choices. Regret stemming from poor decision 
making may cause the decision maker to lose confidence 
in his or her decision making capabilities. These 
negative self-perceptions about decision making 
capabilities can lead to subsequent poor decision 
making which confirms the negative self-perception.
This cyclical process can continue indefinitely. The 
social psychology literature contains examples of this 
type of cyclical decision making such as dieting 
(Haemmerlie & Montgomery, 1982, 1984), states of 
depression, shyness, loneliness, and anxiety (Mendonca 
& Brehm, 1983). According to the literature (e.g. 
Sherman, 1980; Haemmerlie & Montgomery, 1982, 1984), 
people tend to experience self-fulfilling prophecies 
when it comes to self-perceptions and decisions. Those 
who have low self-perceptions tend to have a difficult 
time ending these vicious cycles of dieting, shyness, 
loneliness, depression, or anxiety. For example, an
Regret and Decision Making
36
individual may initially make a poor choice to break a 
diet for a special occasion. This bad choice will, 
after the party, lead to feelings of regret. These 
feelings of regret will lead to negative self- 
perceptions (Haemmerlie & Montgomery, 1982, 19 84) such 
that the individual feels that he or she "can never 
stay on a diet," "will be fat forever," and is an 
"inadequate person because of lack of self-control." 
When confronted with the temptation of dessert at 
another time, that individual may decide that there is 
no reason to try to avoid the temptation since, being 
an inadequate person, he or she would give in 
eventually and eat the dessert anyway.
Summary of Decisional Recrret
In summary, there are many potential antecedents 
and consequences of decisional regret. Some of the 
causes of regret are conflicting alternatives, failing 
to assess all available information, weighting some 
dimensions of alternatives more than'others, and not 
having access to all information pertinent to that 
decision. Possible consequences of regret include 
negative affectivity such as sadness or anger, regret- 
minimizing behavior, dissonance reduction, negative 
self-perceptions, poor choices, and changes in the 
gathering and processing of information. To date, most
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studies have looked at decisional regret as a "one- 
shot" decision. Few have examined decisional regret as 
it affects multiple decisions. Those studies that have 
looked at multiple decision tasks (e.g. Walster, 1964) 
failed to include moderators in their studies which may 
interact with decisional regret.
In the next section, I will review variables that 
can potentially moderate the amount of regret decision 
makers may experience.
Moderators of Regret 
Situational Differences
Magnitude of the discrepancy. The subjective 
magnitude of the discrepancy between "what is" and 
"what could have been" (Sugden, 1985) has an effect on 
the amount of regret a person experiences. The outcome 
of a decision plays a large role in this determinant of 
regret. A student who expected an "A" on an exam but 
earned a "C-" will experience more regret for his or 
her actions (i.e., deciding to go out the night before 
the exam, choosing to watch a favorite television show 
instead of studying, not rereading the test and 
answers, etc.) than the student who expected an "A" but 
received a "B'1 . This is because the discrepancy 
between an "A" and a "C-" is greater than that of an 
"A" and a "B". Both students could have made the same
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decisions prior to the exam and engaged in the same 
behaviors, and yet the former will experience more 
regret than the latter due to the magnitude of the 
discrepancy between expected and actual outcomes.
Sugden also states that the amount of blame the 
decision maker places upon him or herself for the 
original decision will also affect the amount of regret 
experienced. Therefore, in the above example, if the 
student who received a "C-u on the test does not blame 
him or herself for the lack of studying ("My roommate 
was up all night partying and I couldn't concentrate"), 
then the feeling of regret will be less than if that 
person believes he or she is at fault.
Sugden's (1985) theory of regret is just that, a 
theory. He does not have empirical evidence to back up 
his ideas. Instead, he uses scenario examples of 
situations in which the actor makes a decision and 
loses. He then leads the reader to an understanding of 
why a particular scenario would elicit particular 
regret feelings. Sugden also examines utility theory 
models and attempts to explain, in his terms, why 
people tend to violate these models. Although he is 
complete in his review of many of the models, again, he 
does not have empirical evidence to support his claims.
Decision atypicality and alternatives. Kahneman
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and Miller (1986) state that the more abnormal or 
atypical a decision is, relative to the way a similar 
decision is often carried out, the more extreme the 
feeling of regret will be when the decision outcome is 
negative. Moreover, they claim that the greater the 
number of "counterfactual alternatives" that are 
available, the more abnormal the event will seem and 
the greater the subsequent regret will be. For 
example, if a man chooses to take a different route 
home from work than he usually does (abnormal event) 
and gets into an accident, he will feel more regretful 
of his decision than if he would have taken his usual 
route home. This same man will feel even more 
regretful of his actions, however, if there were many 
different routes that he could have chosen instead of 
the one he did (number of counterfactual alternatives).
Kahneman and Miller propose their "norm theory" 
based on results of past research using vignettes to 
assess feelings of regret (see Kahneman & Tversky,
1982). Kahneman and Miller use these results together 
to support their theory of norms; they did not, 
however, examine their "norm theory" directly.
Findings of Simonson (1992) demonstrate, though, 
that decision atypicality may be moderated by decision 
strategy. According to Simonson, the effect of
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multiple alternatives on feelings of regret can be 
diminished if the decision maker uses "default options" 
in choosing one of the alternatives. Simonson found 
that decision makers who anticipated what they would 
feel if they made a wrong decision were more likely to 
choose a lower priced, less well-known alternative. 
Simonson also found that upon making a decision error, 
those subjects who chose the less well-known and least 
expensive alternative experienced a greater feeling of 
responsibility for their choice but also experienced 
less regret.
Active versus passive decisions. Several 
researchers have found that subjects feel greater 
regret following action versus inaction on their part 
(Epstein et a!., 1992; Kahneman & Tversky, 1982; 
Landman, 1987b). Epstein et al. (1992) found support
for this statement. Subjects were asked to read 
different pairs of vignettes regarding the behavior and 
consequences of another person. After reading the 
vignettes, the subjects rated which situation would 
have caused them to feel more foolish or regretful. 
General results indicated that subjects were more upset 
about unusual acts that were accompanied by unfortunate 
outcomes than those normal, routine acts that were 
followed by the same,, unfortunate outcomes. According
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to Landman (1987b), this is because people view normal, 
everyday actions as "non-action" on their part, but 
they perceive an abnormal, unusual action as "action" 
on their part.
Takemura (19 92) also found the above to be true in 
non-interpersonal situations, but found evidence to 
suggest that this predication does not hold true in 
more interpersonal situations. Takemura had 58 
university students complete questionnaires which 
described different hypothetical situations; non­
interpersonal and interpersonal situations with 
negative outcomes stemming from an action (active 
decision) or non-action (passive decision) on the part 
of the actor. Subjects judged the amount of regret 
they believed the actor experienced from this 
situation. In the non-interpersonal decision, subjects 
associated more regret with action on their part than 
non-action, but in the interpersonal decision, subjects 
associated more regret with non-action than action.
Near versus far misses. Epstein et al. (1992)
assert that it is typical for individuals to feel that 
a near miss is more significant than a far miss. They 
imply here that an individual will be more upset if the 
unfortunate outcome of his or her decision could have 
been easily altered (near miss) than if the outcome
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would have been more difficult to change (far miss).
For example, a person who misses a flight by five 
minutes will find it more easy to construct 
alternatives for his or her actions than an individual 
who misses a flight by thirty minutes. This is because 
there are many ways in which five minutes could have 
been cut from the travel time to the airport. However, 
the individual who misses a flight by thirty minutes 
will find it difficult to imagine cutting thirty 
minutes from the travel time to the airport.
Individual Differences
Imagination. Sugden (1985) states that 
imagination is a necessary component in the experience 
of regret because a person must be able to construct 
decision alternatives aside from the decision direction 
actually taken. Again, this is speculation as he does 
not have empirical evidence to support this claim.
Conversely, Scherer and Stutzman's (1994) model 
proposes that imagination or creativity will have 
little effect on regret for those tasks in which the 
decision maker regrets not choosing a previously 
considered alternative from a well-defined set 
(e.g., buying a car with or without automatic windows). 
Alternatively, Scherer and Stutzman claim that regret 
stemming from more complex, unstructured decision tasks
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will be more influenced by individual differences in 
decision making ability to imagine or generate decision 
alternatives. Depending on the particular type of 
task, the decision maker's imagination, creativity or 
even cognitive complexity could influence post- 
decisional generation of alternatives and the 
subsequent regret experienced.
Affective state. The decision maker's initial 
affective state may also moderate the amount of 
decisional regret that a person subsequently 
experiences following a negative decisional outcome. 
Research shows that people in positive affective states 
tend to recall more positive aspects of past situations 
and gloss over the negative aspects (Blaney, 1986;
Bower & Cohen, 1982). Isen, Shalker, Clark, & Karp 
(1978) found that positive affect increases positive 
judgments by subjects and increases the tendency for 
subjects to rate a situation more positively than they 
would otherwise. Thus, not only do people in positive 
affective states recall past events as more favorable 
than those people in neutral affective states, but they 
also perceive present situations more favorably. The 
implication of this is that individuals in initially 
positive affective states may not perceive 
unsatisfactory decision outcomes as unfavorably as
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those in neutral affective states; hence positive 
affect may lessen the amount of regret experienced by 
decision makers.
Summary of Moderators
There are many potential moderators of the amount 
of regret experienced by a decision maker. A complete 
listing would be impossible but among those would 
include: magnitude of the discrepancy between "what is" 
and "what might have been," decision atypicality and 
alternatives, active versus passive decisions, near 
versus far misses, imagination, and affective state. 
This is especially true in the case of affect as a 
moderator since decisional regret contains an affective 
component.
Affect
Little research has been done regarding the 
influence of temporary, affective states on decision 
making processes; and none has examined whether affect 
has a moderating effect on the amount of regret felt by 
decision makers. It is well known that affective 
states or moods influence behavior. It seems that 
these affective states would have an influence on 
decision making processes and on the amount of regret a 
person would experience regarding a past decision.
Affect is defined as a feeling state, our "state
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of mind" (Webster, 1981). Breckler (1984) defines 
affect as an "emotional response, a gut reaction, or 
sympathetic nervous activity" (p. 1191). Clark and
Isen (1982) have stated that "feelings have important 
effects on cognition and behavior, and...because these 
states occur so frequently, understanding their effects 
is extremely important to our understanding of 
behavior" (p. 76) .
Studies have found that people in positive 
affective states tend to avoid situations that will 
decrease this state (Arkes, Herren & Isen, 1988; Isen, 
Nygren, & Ashby, 1988). So when faced with risky 
situations, subjects in positive affective states tend 
to increase risk taking behaviors when the stakes are 
low and decrease risk taking behaviors when the stakes 
are high as compared to controls (Arkes, Herren & Isen, 
1988; Deldin & Levin, 1986; Isen & Geva, 1987; Isen & 
Patrick, 1983) . This behavior may be explained by 
research showing that individuals in positive affective 
states have a greater negative subjective utility for 
losses than do controls (Isen, Nygren & Ashby, 1988); 
thus, they are motivated to avoid losses or bad 
outcomes. It seems that individuals in positive 
affective states have more to lose in a decision task 
than do controls; not only may they make a bad
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decision, but they also run the risk of decreasing 
their positive feelings. (Arkes et al., 1988; Isen et 
al., 1988; Isen & Simmonds, 1978; Mischel, Ebbeson, &
Zeiss, 1976). This research leads me to believe that 
decision makers who are in positive affective states 
will increase their use of cognitive dissonance 
reduction tools in order to remain in good moods. This 
is because if a decision maker experiences regret, he 
or she will also experience negative affect.
Other researchers have found that positive affect 
increases subject's recall of positive memories and 
attitudes (Blaney, 1986; Bower & Cohen, 1982; Carver & 
Scheier, 1990; Clark, Milberg, & Ross, 1983; Clark & 
Waddell, 1983; Deldin & Levin, 1986; Isen et al., 1978;
Turving & Pearlstone, 1966). When asked to recall an 
event from the past, subjects in positive affective 
states tend to focus more on the positive aspects of 
the situation and to gloss over the negative aspects. 
This could have implications with regard to regret and 
subsequent decision making. When recalling past 
outcomes of similar decisions, the individual may not 
completely assess the pros and cons of the past 
behavior and thus may not learn from past mistakes.
The individual may feel confident that he or she is 
able to make a good decision regardless of past
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outcomes.
In the same vein, Isen et al. (1978) found that
positive affect increases the tendency for subjects to 
rate a situation more positively than they would 
otherwise. These researchers manipulated affect in 
subjects and then asked them to rate the performance 
and service records of household products (i.e., 
automobiles and television sets). They found that 
those who had received free gifts, and thus were higher 
in positive affect, rated these household items higher 
than control subjects. Again, this could affect both 
feelings of regret and decision making. For example, 
individuals in positive affective states may assess 
situations much more positively than those in neutral 
affective states. Those people in positive affective 
states may see situations much more optimistically; 
they may not even consider the negative attributes of 
their choices or may weight the positive aspects more 
than the negative. If there is a link between positive 
affect and cognitive dissonance reduction, we may find 
that positive affect can cause the individual to skip 
directly to dissonance reduction techniques and not 
even dwell on possible mistakes in reasoning.
In conclusion, affective states have been 
demonstrated to affect behavior, memories and
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attitudes, and evaluation of situations. It is very 
possible that affective states may also affect the 
evaluation of negatively valenced additional 
information and thus, affect feelings of regret.
Summary
In general, it is assumed that an individual's 
affective state will moderate the effect of the valence 
of additional information regarding decision 
alternatives in terms of the amount of post-decisional 
regret experienced, confidence levels, ratings of 
decision alternatives and subsequent choice.
Individuals in positive affective states who are given 
negatively valenced additional information will not be 
influenced by this information to the same degree as 
those subjects in the neutral affective states. Those 
in a positive.affective state are motivated to maintain 
this positive state (Arkes et al., 1988; Isen et al.,
1988), tend to recall the more positive rather than the 
negative aspects of their previous decision (Blaney, 
1986; Bower & Cohen, 1982; Clark et al., 1983; Deldin & 
Levin, 1986), and tend to rate the situation more 
positively than they would otherwise (Isen et al.,
1978). They will tend to rationalize their decision or 
distort the additional information in order to maintain 
this positive state. On the other hand, those subjects
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in the neutral affective state do not have this 
affective buffer. They will simply act as the regret 
research suggests; they will experience post-decisional 
regret and low confidence, and they will have a high 
likelihood of changing ratings of decision alternatives 
and subsequent choice.
This Investigation
To date, there is little research on the 
phenomenon of decisional regret. It seems that most of 
the literature contains speculation about the 
antecedents, moderators, processes and consequences of 
regret rather than offering empirical evidence. There 
are many unanswered questions in the area of decisional 
regret as there are various factors that could affect 
and/or moderate the amount of regret experienced and 
how that regret will affect the individual and future 
behaviors.
This investigation examined some variables that 
influence the amount of decisional regret experienced 
and changes in subsequent decision processes and 
choices. Specifically, the study examined the 
moderating effect of affective state on the amount of 
regret experienced by the decision maker given either 
negatively or neutrally valenced additional information 
regarding a prior decision choice.
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Little, if any, research has been done regarding 
the valence of additional information and its effects 
on future decision making. Again, Walster (1964) 
tested the affect of additional information (jobs 
subjects were to be assigned) on subsequent ratings, 
but the valence of information was not manipulated 
between subjects.
Hypotheses
Hypothesis 1 . Affect and information valence will 
have an interactive effect and two separate main 
effects on amount of regret experienced.
a: When given negatively valenced additional 
information regarding a past choice, subjects in 
neutral affective states will experience 
significantly more post-decisional regret than 
subjects in positive affective states. When given 
neutrally valenced additional information, 
differences in regret for positive and neutral 
affect subjects will be relatively smaller.
b: Across both levels of information, positive 
affect subjects are predicted to report less regret 
than neutral affect subjects.
c: There will be a main effect for information, 
with negatively valenced information causing more 
regret than neutral valenced information.
Hypothesis 2 . Affect and information valence will 
have an interactive effect and two separate main 
effects on amount of confidence experienced.
a: When given negatively valenced additional 
information regarding a past choice, subjects in 
neutral affective states will experience 
significantly less confidence in their decision than 
subjects in positive affective states. When given 
neutrally valenced additional information, 
differences in regret for positive and neutral 
affect subjects will be relatively smaller.
Regret and Decision Making
51
b: Across both levels of information, positive 
affect subjects are predicted to report more 
.confidence than neutral affect subjects.
c: There will be a main effect for information, 
with negatively valenced information causing less 
confidence than neutrally valenced information.
Hypothesis 3 . Affect and information valence will 
have an interactive effect and two separate main 
effects on changes of ratings of originally chosen 
alternative.
a: When given negatively valenced additional 
information regarding a past choice, subjects in 
neutral affective states will change ratings of 
originally chosen alternative significantly more 
than subjects in positive affective states. When 
given neutrally valenced additional information, 
differences in ratings of originally chosen 
alternative for positive and neutral affect subjects 
will be relatively smaller.
b: Across both levels of information, positive 
affect subjects are predicted to change ratings of 
originally chosen alternative less than neutral 
affect subjects.
c: There will be a main effect for information, 
with negatively valenced information causing 
subjects to change ratings of originally chosen 
alternative more than neutrally valenced 
information.
Hypothesis 4 . Affect and information valence will 
have an interactive effect and two separate main 
effects on change of average ratings of original 
non-chosen alternatives.
a: When given negatively valenced additional 
information regarding a past choice, subjects in 
neutral affective states will change average ratings 
of original non-chosen alternatives significantly 
more than subjects in positive affective states.
When given neutrally valenced additional 
information, differences in average ratings of 
original non-chosen alternatives for positive and 
neutral affect subjects will be relatively smaller.
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b: Across both levels of information, positive 
affect subjects are predicted to change average 
ratings of original non-chosen alternatives less 
than neutral affect subjects.
c: There will be a main effect for information, 
with negatively valenced information causing 
subjects to change average ratings of original non- 
chosen alternatives more than neutrally valenced 
information.
Hypothesis 5 . Affect and information valence will 
have an interactive effect and two separate main 
effects on changes of ratings of subsequently chosen 
alternative (time two, after manipulations).
a: When given negatively valenced additional 
information regarding a past choice, subjects in 
neutral affective states will show a change in 
ratings of subsequently chosen alternative 
significantly more than subjects in positive 
affective states. When given neutrally valenced 
additional information, differences in ratings of 
subsequently chosen alternative for positive and 
neutral affect subjects will be relatively smaller.
b: Across both levels of information, positive 
affect subjects are predicted to show a change in 
ratings of subsequently chosen alternative less than 
neutral affect subjects.
c: There will be a main effect for information, 
with negatively valenced information causing 
subjects to show a change in ratings of subsequently 
chosen alternative more than neutrally valenced 
information.
Hypothesis 6 . Affect and information valence will 
have an interactive effect and two separate main 
effects on change of average ratings of subsequently 
non-chosen alternatives (time two, after 
manipulations).
a: When given negatively valenced additional 
information regarding a past choice, subjects in 
neutral affective states will show a change in 
average ratings of subsequently non-chosen 
alternatives significantly more than subjects in 
positive affective states. When given neutrally
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valenced additional information, differences in 
average ratings of subsequently non-chosen 
alternatives for positive and neutral affect 
subjects will be relatively smaller.
b: Across both levels of information, positive 
affect subjects are predicted to show a change in 
average ratings of subsequently non-chosen 
alternatives less than neutral affect subjects.
c: There will be a main effect for information, 
with negatively valenced information causing 
subjects to show a change in average ratings of 
subsequently non-chosen alternatives more than 
neutrally valenced information.
Hypothesis 7 . Affect and information valence will 
have an interactive effect on the frequency of 
changes in choice of alternative from time one to 
time two. Specifically, neutral affect subjects 
given negatively valenced additional information 
will be more likely to make a different alternative 
choice at time two than the other three conditions.
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Methods
The major purpose of this experiment was to 
determine whether affective state moderates the effect 
of the valence of additional information regarding a 
past decision on the decision maker's regret, 
confidence and subsequent ratings of alternatives and 
choice.
Pilot Experiments
Four pilot studies were conducted prior to the 
main study in order to determine appropriate 
manipulations of the independent variables. Psychology 
students from the University of Nebraska at Omaha were 
used as subjects in all pilot studies.
Studies Testing the Manipulation of Additional 
Information
Two pilot studies were conducted to appropriately 
manipulate the "valence of additional information" 
factor. In the first study, 37 students were asked to 
simply list the various characteristics of professors 
they liked and disliked. The list of characteristics 
generated by subjects is included in Appendix A.
In a second study, 64 subjects were presented with 
the list of professor attributes generated in the first 
study and asked to rate them on a five point scale.
The scale points were anchored as follows: 1 = "Like
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very much in a teacher", 3 = "Doesn't affect liking one 
way or another", and 5 = "Dislike very much in a 
teacher". See questionnaire in Appendix B. Eleven 
characteristics were found to have the greatest effect 
on students' likes or dislikes of professors. These 
characteristics, their means, standard deviations and 
the ranges can be found in Table 1. From these 11 
characteristics, the following four were used as the 
additional information in the final experiment: 
Negatively valenced additional information =
"Frequently unprepared for class" and "Has little 
patience with students," neutrally valenced additional 
information = "Arrives to class on time" and "Teaches 
in a very professional manner."
Studies Testing the Effectiveness of Affect 
Manipulation
The purpose of this study was to test the 
effectiveness of the affect manipulation. Thirty-two 
subjects were used in the first test of the affect 
manipulation. Sixteen of these subjects were exposed 
to the positive affect manipulation; reading comics. 
These subjects were left in a room and allowed to read 
"The Indispensable Calvin and Hobbes"' (Watterson, 1992) 
and "The Official College Quiz Book" (Ahern,
Bretnwalte, Bridgeman, Gray, Jones, Kinzer, Oatman,
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Table 1
Descriptive Statistics for Ratings of Professor 
Characteristics
Professor Characteristics M SD Ranqe
1. Seems bored with job. 4 . 60 . 768 1/5
2 . Speaks in very monotone 4 . 64 . 650 2 , 5
3 .
manner.
Frequently unprepared for 4 . 51 . 564 3 , 5
4 .
class.
Has little patience 4 . 70 . 500 3/5
5 .
with students.
Does not review before exam 4 .40 ; 750 2 , 5
6 . Dresses sloppily. 3 .33 . 780 2 , 5
7 . Arrives to class on time 2 . 69 . 790 1/3
8 . Teaches in very professional 
and businesslike manner. 2 . 68 . 960 1/4
9 . Tests are mix of essay, 
multiple choice, and 2 . 61 1 . 02 1/5
10 .
fill-in.
Lectures very slowly. 3 .43 . 92 2,5
11. Gives more than 3 exams. 2.49 . 90 1/4
Note. N = 64.
Based on a scale of 1 to 5 with 1 being "like very much 
in a professor" and 5 being "dislike very much in a 
professor."
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Taylor, Warwick, & Zirkie, 1990). This method has been 
shown to be highly reliable in various other studies 
and situations (Baron, 1983, 1984; Carnevale & Isen,
1986). . The other sixteen subjects (neutral affect 
condition) were simply left alone in the experiment 
room. After the experimenter returned, subjects in 
both conditions were asked to complete a survey for the 
presumed purpose of determining the general affective 
state of college students in the country. There were 
asked to be as accurate as possible. The questionnaire 
required subjects to complete the scale for the 
following three items: "How do you feel at the present
moment," "How have you felt in the past few weeks?" and 
"How do you generally feel?". See questionnaire in 
Appendix C. The latter two time frames were included 
in order to conceal the fact that the experimenter was 
only interested in the "moment" affective state. 
Embedded in the survey was the affective state question 
which asked subjects how they felt "right now."
Subjects responded to the question on a semantic 
differential scale consisting of four bipolar 
adjectives. Factor analysis evidence from both Scherer 
(1989) and Whigham and Scherer (1991) indicate that all 
items loaded on one factor, which they interpreted as a 
measure of a "happiness/sadness" affective state. In
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this analysis, all other items were disregarded and 
only the "moment" items were used. Unfortunately, 
results demonstrate that there was not a significant 
difference between conditions, F(4,27) = .72, p > .05.
In an attempt to find a effective manipulation, a 
second pilot study was conducted. Sixty subjects were 
used in this experiment. In this study, positive 
affect was induced by allowing subjects (n = 30) to 
read the book "The Indispensable Calvin and Hobbes" 
(Watterson, 1992) and a comic book entitled "The 
Official College Quiz Book" (Ahern, et al., 1990). 
Subjects in the neutral condition (n = 30) were asked 
to read an article entitled "Canada's Support of the 
United Nations Peace-Keeping Operations" (Sheikh,
1969). See Appendix D. This article was chosen 
specifically for this experiment and has not been used 
for the purpose of inducing neutral affect in the past.
The subjects in the positive affect condition were 
first told by the experimenter that she was in the 
middle of an experiment with another subject and that 
she must finish before beginning their experiment. The 
room in which the subjects were waiting had the two 
comic books in it. The experimenter told the subject 
that the comics were left behind by another 
experimenter and that they were more than welcome to
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read them while they waited for her to return.
Subjects in the neutral condition were told that they 
would be participating in a reading comprehension study 
and would be asked to read an article and then answer 
some questions. Upon returning to the subjects, the 
experimenter gave the subjects the same affect scale as 
was used in the previous pilot study (see Appendix C). 
Multi-variate analysis of variance results demonstrated 
that the affect manipulations were very powerful with 
those subjects in the positive affect condition 
reporting significantly more positive affective states 
than those in the neutral affect condition, F(4,55) =
13.80, p < .05. Thus, these manipulations were used in 
the final experiment to induce positive and neutral 
affective states.
Primary Experiment
Subi ects
One hundred and thirty-two students from the 
University of Nebraska participated in this study. 
Subjects were volunteers who received extra academic 
credit in their psychology classes in exchange for 
their participation. All subjects signed an inform 
consent (Appendix E). Subjects ranged in age from 18 
to 50 with a mean age of 25.8. There were 47 (36%)
male participants and 85 (64%) female participants. Of
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the total subject pool, psychology majors accounted for 
27%, medical profession majors accounted for 22%, 
education majors accounted for 10% and the various 
other majors accounted for the remaining 41%. Subjects 
included 19 freshmen, 3 5 sophomores, 3 5 juniors, 3 6 
seniors and 7 graduate students.
Design
Subjects were randomly assigned to one of four 
cells of a 2 X 2 factorial design, with affective state 
(positive vs neutral) and the valence of additional 
information (neutral vs negative).
Prior to the exposure to the affect and valence of 
additional information treatments, the following 
covariate measures were taken: regret, confidence, and
ratings of decision alternative. This was done 
in order to utilize covariate analysis of variance in 
the data analysis. Covariate analysis of variance is a 
very powerful design that will increase the power of 
a test when all assumptions are met. According to 
Arvey, Cole, Hazucha and Hartanto (1985) and Kirk 
(1986), designs that adjust for pre-existing 
differences tend to decrease the standard error of the 
statistic and thus increase power. They suggest using 
analysis of covariance when sample size is greater than 
100 because in these situations ANCOVA is more powerful
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than post-test or gain-score analysis.
Kirk (1986, p. 719-720) states that covariates 
must meet the following assumptions: (a) they must be
extraneous sources of variation that are irrelevant to 
the objectives of the experiment, (b) experimental 
control of these sources of variance are not possible 
or feasible, (c) the covariate observation is gathered 
before the treatment conditions are administered, (d) 
and the covariate is unaffected by the treatment. The 
covariate variables in this experiment met all of the 
above assumptions since we were not interested in the 
regret and confidence of the subjects prior to the 
introduction of the independent variables. Thus, in 
order to increase the power of the tests, covariate 
analysis of variance was used in this study.
Task
Subjects were asked to rate and choose (vote) 
among four candidates for an assistant professor 
position at the university using information they were 
given via a computer regarding the alternatives. See 
Appendix D. The computer was programed so that it 
appeared to be an official, University of Nebraska at 
Omaha project (Appendix F). The purpose of the project 
was explained and the instructions for using the 
"voting and tabulation program" were given. Subjects
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were shown four different candidates and a matrix of 
their qualifications. These qualifications fell under 
four different categories: graduate school attended, 
courses taught, research completed, and memberships and 
committees served. Subjects were encouraged to 
carefully read and evaluate the information for each 
candidate, provide their ratings of each candidate 
using the five-point scale provided and then choose the 
candidate they would prefer the university hire. Once 
they made these decisions, they "clicked" on the ENTER 
button on the screen and their decision was transmitted 
and tabulated at a central university location. At 
that point, the computer led them to believe that their 
decision was transmitted and was irrevocable. A 
message on the computer screen was displayed that 
thanked the subjects for helping the university 
evaluate the candidates and hire a professor. This 
message also displayed the package name and version 
number. The version number was an indicant to the 
experimenter as to which professor the subject chose. 
For example, "Version 3 ..1" indicated that the subject 
chose Professor A, "Version 3.2." indicated that the 
subject chose Professor B, etc.
Subjects also completed a similar task of rating 
and choosing alternatives but without the use of the
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computer. The computer was not used for this task 
because the experimenter did not want the subjects to 
know that this task was related to the previous 
computer task. The information they were given in this 
task was the same as they received on the computer but 
also included additional information about each 
alternative that was not previously available on the 
computer task. See Appendix G.
Subjects also completed a task in which they were 
to report their feelings of regret based on a five 
point scale (1 = "Definitely change my decision," 2 = 
Probably change my decision," 3 = "Possibly change my 
decision," 4 = "Probably not change my decision," and 5 
= "Definitely not change my decision." Subjects then 
completed a similar scale asking them to report their 
confidence level based on a seven point scale (1 = "I 
am 100% confident that I made the right decision," 2 = 
"I am 85% confident that I made the right decision," 3 
= "I am 70% confident that I made the right decision,"
4 = "I am 55% confident that I made the right 
decision," 5 = "I am 30% confident that I made the 
right decision," 6 = "I am 15% confident that I made 
the right decision," and 7 "I have no confidence 
what-so-ever in my decision."
Finally, subjects completed the same affect
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questionnaire which was used in the pilot study. They 
simply reported how they were feeling "At this present 
moment," "In the past few weeks," and "In general."
See Appendix D .
Dependent Measures
The dependent variables in this study consisted of 
regret ratings (Appendix H), confidence ratings 
(Appendix I), ratings of initially chosen candidates at 
time two (Appendix J), average ratings of initially 
unchosen candidates at time two (Appendix H), ratings 
of subsequently chosen candidates at time two, average 
ratings of subsequently unchosen candidates at time 
two, and choice of candidates (Appendix J ). These 
measures were taken after the subjects were exposed to 
the independent variables; affect condition and 
additional information condition.
The regret data were gathered at two different 
times, once before the introduction of the independent 
variables and once after the introduction of the 
independent variables. Subjects were asked to report 
their feelings of regret after making each decision 
(Appendix H). Subjects were also asked to report their 
confidence levels after each decision task (Appendix 
I) .
Another dependent variable was the ratings of the
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chosen alternative. This measure was based on the 
rating of the initially chosen candidate on the second 
rating task. The other dependent variable was similar, 
but was the rating of the subsequently chosen candidate 
on the second rating task.
Similarly, average rating of the unchosen 
alternatives was another dependent variable. The 
ratings of the initially unchosen alternatives on the 
second rating task were used here. The other dependent 
variable was based on the average rating of the 
subsequently unchosen candidates on the second rating 
task.
Finally, the change in alternative choice from 
decision task one to decision task two was another 
dependent variable.
Procedures
Before beginning the experiment, the experimental 
conditions were randomly determined. This was done 
previous to meeting subjects in order for the 
experimenter to prepare the experiment room for the 
appropriate condition before the arrival of the 
subj ects.
The subjects were greeted individually in the hall 
outside the experiment room. Subjects were told that 
they were participants in a variety of different
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studies which were being conducted at one time to save
the subjects' time. Subjects were first asked to sign
a consent form before beginning the experiment 
(Appendix E). They were told that their first task was
to complete a university sponsored evaluation of
faculty applicants that was being conducted via 
computer. The experimenter began the computer program 
to get the subjects started (Appendix F). Subjects 
were then left alone to complete the computer task. 
Subjects were then asked to complete a confidence scale 
(Appendix I) and a regret scale (Appendix H) regarding 
the decision they made on the computer.
Upon completion of the computer task, the 
subjects were then given either the reading 
comprehension task if in the neutral affective 
condition (Appendix K) or the comic book task if in the 
positive affective condition (Appendix L). When 
subjects finished this task, the experimenter began the 
next study.
In the next study, the experimenter told the 
subjects that she was interested in how past student 
evaluations of professors affect the perceptions of 
other students of those professors. Subjects were then 
given the appropriate additional information for the 
condition to which they were assigned (Appendix G).
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After rating and choosing the candidate they would most 
like to see hired, the experimenter again asked 
subjects to rate their confidence level (Appendix I) 
and their amount of regret (Appendix H) for their 
decision. The experimenter then gave the subjects the 
last task which they were told was a study to determine 
the global affective state of college students 
(Appendix D). After completing the above tasks, 
subjects were debriefed, given their participation 
credit and released.
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Results
i
Overview and Preliminary Analyses
The purpose of this experiment was to determine if 
affective state would moderate the effects of the 
valence of additional information on post-decisional 
regret, confidence, subsequent candidate ratings and 
choice. It was proposed that analysis of covariance be 
used to partial out the effects of ratings at time one 
before examining the hypothesized relationship between 
affect, additional information and the dependent 
variables. Unfortunately, the assumption of 
homogeneity of • regression for performing analysis of 
covariance was not satisfied (see Kirk, 1986, p. 732). 
Specifically, the data violated the assumption that the 
within-group regression coefficients are homogeneous 
for treatment levels. See Table 2 for within-group 
coefficients. The F-ratios for all covariates, except 
the rating of the previously chosen candidate at time 
two, were all significant. Thus, the assumption of 
homogeneity of regression coefficients was violated in 
all but one case. Since the correlations within 
treatment levels were not homogeneous, the analysis of 
covariance would result in biased estimates of the 
treatment effects and conceal true differences among 
the dependent variable means (Kirk, 1986, p. 732,
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Table 2
Regression Coefficients for Each Dependent Variable
Regressed on Its Corresoonding Covariate Within Each
Treatment Level
Treatments DV1 DV2 DV3 DV4 DV5 DV6
Main Effects Affect
Positive . 07 .40 . 09 .30 . 44 . 15
Neutral . 52 . 68 - . 02 .28 .33 . 2 5
Main Effects
Valence of Information
Neutral .41 . 60 .33 . 14 . 55 . 09
Negative . 18 . 50 - .21 .46 . 23 .29
Interactions
Positive affect 
by neutral info.
.29 .30 .52 . 24 . 72 . 15
Positive affect 
by negative info.
- . 06 .38 - .25 .37 . 16 .17
Neutral affect 
by neutral info.
. 57 . 73 . 02 . 03 .26 . 02
Neutral affect 
by negative info.
. 52 .65 - . 23 . 57 .39 .45
Note. DV1 - Regret , DV2 - Confidence, DV3 -Rating of
originally chosen candidate at time two, DV4 - Average 
ratings of originally unchosen candidates at time two, 
DV5 - Rating of subsequently chosen candidate at time 
two, DV6 - Average ratings of subsequently 
unchosen candidates at time two.
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Keppel, 1982, p. 503) or result in a loss of power 
(Atiqullah, 1964). Thus, analysis of variance was used 
to evaluate the hypotheses.
In the following section, I will discuss results 
of the descriptive statistics and evaluate each of the 
hypotheses of this study in order.
Descriptive Statistics
Descriptive statistics were calculated both for 
information and to check the data for errors in data- 
entry. Means, standard deviations and ranges for the 
dependent variables can be found in Table 3.
Affect Manipulation Check
As a manipulation check for the effect of the 
affect manipulation, subjects were asked to report 
their affective states at the end of the experiment. 
Multivariate analysis of variance found that the affect 
manipulation had a significant effect on subjects7 
affective states, F(l, 128) = 4.39, p < .05. This
provides evidence that the affect manipulation 
influenced subjects7 affective states and that these 
states endured through the duration of the experiment. 
Evaluation of Hypotheses
Results for regret. The first hypothesis stated 
that there would be a main effect of both affective 
state and valence of additional information and an
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interaction between the two on self-reported regret. 
Contrary to this hypothesis, none of these effects were 
obtained. The interaction of affect and valence of 
information was non-significant, F(l, 128) = .010, ns.
In addition, affect did not have a significant main 
effect on regret, F(l, 128) = 0.24, ns, nor did 
valence of additional information have a significant 
effect on regret F(l, 128) = 2.16, ns. Means and
standard deviations are presented in Table 4.
Results for confidence. The second hypothesis 
stated that there would be an interaction effect of 
affect and valence of additional information and two 
main effects, affect and valence of additional 
information, on confidence level. Again, none of the 
predicted relationships for self-reported confidence 
were significant. The interaction effect of affect by 
information was not significant with F(l, 128) = 1.40,
ns. The main effect of affect on confidence was also 
non-significant, F(l, 128) = .12, ns. The effect of
valence of information on confidence was not 
significant, although it was marginal and in the 
predicted direction, F(l, 128) = 3.03, p = .08. Means
and standard deviations for confidence by condition are 
presented in Table 5.
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Table 4
Means and Standard Deviations for Regret at Time Two
Regret at Time Two
Breakdowns M SD
Main Effect Affect
Positive 3 . 92 . 98
Neutral 4 . 00 . 78
Main Effect Valence 
of Information
Neutral 4 .10 . 75
Negative 3 . 85 1. 00
Interactions
Positive affect 
by neutral info. 4 . 03 .81
Positive affect 
by negative info. 3 . 82 1.13
Neutral affect 
by neutral info. 4 . 12 . 70
Neutral affect 
by negative info. 3 . 88 .86
Note. N = 132.
Scale: 1 = "Definitely Change Decision", 2 "Probably
Change Decision", 3 = "Possibly Change Decision", 4 = 
"Probably Not Change Decision", 5 = "Definitely Not 
Change Decision"
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Table 5
Means and Standard Deviations for Confidence at Time
Two
Confidence at Time Two
Breakdowns M SD
Main Effect Affect
Positive 5 . 71 1.31
Neutral 5 . 64 1.21
Main Effect Valence 
of Information
Neutral 5.86 1. 01
Negative 5.49 1.45
Interactions
Positive affect 
by neutral info. 6 . 03 . 85
Positive affect 
by negative info. 5.39 1.60
Neutral affect 
by neutral info. 5 . 70 1.13
Neutral affect 
by negative info. 5 .58 1.30
Note. N = 132.
Scale: 1 = "No Confidence at all", 2 "15% Confident",
3 = "30% Confident", 4 = "55% Confident", 5 = "70% 
Confident", 6 = "85% Confident", 7 = "100% Confident"
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Results for rating of originally chosen candidate
at time two. The third hypothesis stated that there 
would be an interactive effect of affect and 
valence of additional information on ratings of 
originally chosen candidate at the time two 
measurement. In addition, a main effect of affect and 
a main effect for valence of additional information on 
this variable was hypothesized. Although there was not 
a main effect of affect, both the main effect for 
valence of information and the interaction effect of 
affect and valence of information were significant 
(See Table 6). It was predicted that subjects in 
neutral affective states given negatively valenced 
additional information regarding their previous choice 
would change ratings of the originally chosen candidate 
significantly more than subjects in positive affective 
states. It was further predicted there would be a 
relatively small difference in change of ratings of 
originally chosen candidates between positive and 
neutral affective states when additional information 
was neutrally valenced. The data revealed partial 
support for the form of the interaction. Subjects in 
the positive affect condition who received neutral 
information tended to give the highest ratings to the 
previously chosen candidate. Contrary to the
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Table 6
Analysis of Variance Table of Rating Candidate Chosen 
in First Rating Task on Subsequent Ratings by Affect. 
Information, and Affect by Information
Source of 
Variation
Sum of 
Sauares DF
Mean
Sauare F E
Main Effects 88 . 79 2 44 .39 29.36 . 00
Affect 3 . 67 1 3 . 67 2 .43 . 12
Information 85 .12 1 85 . 12 56 .30 . 00
Interaction 5 . 94 1 5 . 94 3 . 93 . 05
Affect by Info 5 .04 1 5 . 94 3 . 92 . 05
Explained 94 . 72 3 31 . 58 20 . 89 .00
Residual 193.52 128 1. 51
Total 288 . 24 131 2 .20
Note. N = 132.
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hypothesis, though, subjects in the positive affect 
condition who received negative information tended to 
give the lowest ratings to the previously chosen 
candidate (See Figure 1). The main effect for 
additional information was in the predicted direction 
with subjects receiving negatively valenced additional 
information giving lower ratings to the previously 
chosen candidate in the second rating task than those 
subjects receiving neutrally valenced additional 
information. For means and standard deviations see 
Table 7.
Results for average of originally unchosen 
candidates at time two. The fourth hypothesis stated 
that there would be an interaction effect of affect by 
valence of information and two main effects, affect and 
valence of information, on the average rating of the 
originally non-chosen candidates in the second rating 
task. Results show that there was no significant main 
effects and no significant interaction effect. The 
interaction, affect by valence of information, had a 
non-significant effect of F(l, 128) = .22, ns. Affect
as an independent variable had a non-significant effect 
of F(l, 128) = .00, ns. Information valence as an 
independent variable had a non-significant effect of 
F(l, 12 8) = 1.04, ns. All means and standard
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«  Negatively Valenced 
Information
o  Neutrally Valenced 
Information
4.40
4.30
4.20
4.10
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3.90
3.80
3.70
3.60
3.50
3.40
3.30
3.20
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2.10
2.00
Positive Neutral
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Figure 1. Ratings of previously chosen candidate at time two as a function of affect 
and information
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Table 7
Means and Standard Deviations for Ratings of Time One 
Chosen Candidate at Time Two
Rating of Time 
Candidate at
One Chosen 
Time Two
Breakdowns M SD
Main Effects Affect
Positive 3.41 1.62
Neutral 3 . 74 1.32
Main Effect Valence 
of Information
Neutral 4 .38 . 92
Negative 2 . 77 1. 51
Interactions
Positive affect 
by neutral info. 4 .42 1. 09
Positive affect 
by negative info. 2.39 1.44
Neutral affect 
by neutral info. 4 .33 . 74
Neutral affect 
by negative info. 3 .15 1.50
Note. N = 132.
Scale: 1 = "Dislike a lot", 2 "Dislike a little", 3 =
"No preference", 4 = "Like a little", 5 = "Like a lot"
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deviations can be found in Table 8.
Results for rating of subsequently chosen 
candidate at time two. The fifth hypothesis 3tated 
that there would be an interaction effect, affect by 
valence of information, and two main effects, affect 
and valence of information, on subsequently chosen 
candidate rating at time two. Results show that the 
interaction effect of affect by valence of information 
was non-significant with F{1, 128) = 1.49, ns. Affect,
as a main effect, did not significantly affect the 
candidate rating, F(l, 128) = .61, ns. As predicted, 
though, valence of additional information had a 
significant effect on the rating of the candidate 
chosen at time two, F(l, 128) = 3.82, p < .05.
Subjects given negatively valenced additional 
information after the first rating gave a lower rating 
to the candidate chosen at time two. Means and 
standard deviations can be found in Table 9.
Results for average of subsequently unchosen 
candidates at time two. According to hypothesis 6, 
affect and valence of additional information should 
have both main effects and an interaction effect on 
average ratings of subsequently unchosen candidates at 
time two. Again, results show that the interaction was 
not significant, F(l, 128) = 1.07, ns. And, although
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Table 8
Means and Standard Deviations for Ratings of Time One
Unchosen Candidates at Time Two
Ratings of Time 
Candidates at
One Unchosen 
Time Two
Breakdowns M SD ,
Main Effects Affect
Positive 3 . 37 . 73
Neutral 3 . 37 . 75
Main Effect Valence 
of Information
Neutral 3.30 . 78
Negative 3 .43 . 68
Interactions
Positive affect 
by neutral info. 4 . 03 . 81
Positive affect 
by negative info. 3 . 82 1. 13
Neutral affect 
by neutral info. 4 . 12 . 70
Neutral affect 
by negative info. 3 . 88 . 86
Note. N = 132.
Scale: 1 = "Dislike a lot", 2 "Dislike a little", 3 =
"No preference", 4 = "Like a little", 5 = "Like a lot"
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Table 9
Means and Standard Deviations for Ratings of Time Two
Chosen Candidate at Time Two
Ratings
Candidate
of
at
Chosen 
Time Two
M SD
Main Effect Affect
Positive 4 .21 1 . 17
Neutral 4 .24 .86
Main Effects Valence 
of Additional Information
Neutral 4 .44 .86
Negative 4 . 02 1.13
Interactions
Positive affect 
by neutral info. 4 . 52 . 94
Positive affect 
by negative info. 3 . 91 1.31
Neutral affect 
by neutral info. 4 .36 . 78
Neutral affect 
by negative info. 4 .12 . 93
Note. N = 132.
Scale: 1 = "Dislike a lot"# 2 "Dislike a little", 3 =
"No preference", 4 = "Like a little", 5 = "Like a lot"
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the main effect of affect was not significant, F(l,
128) = .31, ns, the valence of information main effect
was significant, F(l, 120) - 5.GO, p < .05. Those 
subjects who received negatively valenced additional 
information after their first decision gave lower 
ratings to their unchosen alternatives at time two 
compared to those receiving neutrally valenced 
additional information after their first decision. See 
Table 10 for means and standard deviations.
Results for change in candidate choice. Finally, 
Hypothesis 7 stated that there would be an interaction 
effect and two main effects of affect, valence of 
information, and affect by valence of information on 
the choice of the alternative candidate. Specifically, 
frequency of subjects changing their choices from time 
one to time two were analyzed using multi-way frequency 
analysis. Multi-way frequency analysis is related to 
the loglinear analysis and tests the association of 
discrete variables. Unlike the Chi-Square test, 
though, multi-way frequency analysis can calculate the 
association of more than two discrete variables. This 
analysis is "like a multiple regression or a 
nonparametric analysis of variance with a discrete" 
(Tabachnick & Fidell, 1989, p. 237) dependent variable 
as well as discrete independent variables. Results of
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Table 10
Means and Standard Deviations of Time Two Unchosen 
Candidate at Time Two
Ratings
Candidate
of Unchosen 
at Time Two
M SD
Main Effect Affect
Positive 3 . 09 . 77
Neutral 3 . 16 . 71
Main Effect Valenced 
Additional Information
Neutral 3 .27 . 79
Negative 2 . 97 . 66
Interactions
Positive affect 
by neutral info. 3 .30 . 84
Positive affect 
by negative info. 3 . 87 . 65
Neutral affect 
by neutral info. 3 . 24 . 76
Neutral affect 
by negative info. 3 . 07 .67
Note. N = 132.
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multi-way frequency analysis give the researcher both 
the confidence intervals and multi-way frequency 
coefficients which are parameters or deviations from 
the grand mean. These deviations are derived from 
natural logarithms of the proportions of expected 
frequencies divided by N (Tabachnick & Fidell, 1989). 
These parameter estimates are then converted in a three 
step process to standard scores to compare relative 
contributions of the various parameters to the 
frequency in a cell (See Haberman, 1978).
Confidence intervals obtained from multi-way 
frequency analysis demonstrate significant associations 
if the interval does not include zero. The confidence 
interval for the interaction of affect by information 
was not significant (Coefficient = .194941, Lower 
Confidence Interval = -.10512, Upper Confidence 
Interval = .31500). The main effect of affect on 
ratings was also non-significant (Coefficient = .54248, 
Lower Confidence Interval = -.15581, Upper Confidence 
Interval = .26431). Consistent with the hypothesis, 
the main effect of information was significant 
(Coefficient = .666943, Lower Confidence Interval = 
.45688, Upper Confidence Interval = .87700). Those 
given negatively valenced additional information 
changed their choices from time one to time two
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significantly more compared to those given neutrally 
valenced additional information. Of the 66 subjects in 
neutrally valenced additional information condition, 16 
(24%) changed their candidate choice, whereas 55 (83%)
of the 66 subjects in negatively valenced additional 
information condition changed their candidate choice. 
Reported F Values
Because, at first glance, many of the reported F 
values were less than one, an analysis was done to 
determine if a significant number of these values were 
too low. If a significant number of F values fall 
below one, it is possible that the F test assumptions 
may not be tenable. Overall, there were 18 F tests in 
this study, seven of which were less than one. The 
inverse of these seven F's were computed and the 
resulting value was compared to critical F's of the F 
distribution. For the tests of regret, two F tests 
were less than one. The obtained F value for the 
effect of affect on regret was .01. Analysis 
demonstrates that this value is significantly less than 
one F (1,128) = 100, p < .05. Also, the obtained F
value for the effect of affect by valence of additional 
information was .24. Analysis demonstrates that this 
value was not significantly less than one F (1,128) = 
4.16, p > ns.
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For the tests of confidence, one F test was less 
than one. The obtained F value for the effect of 
affect on confidence was .12. Analysis demonstrates 
that this value is significantly less than 1.0,
F (1,128) = 8.343, p < .05.
For the tests of average ratings of originally 
unchosen candidates at time two, two F tests were less 
than one. The obtained F value for the effect of 
affect on the average ratings of originally unchosen 
candidates at time two was .00. This value is 
obviously significantly less than 1.0, F (1,128) p <
.05. Also, the obtained F value for the effect of 
affect by valence of additional information was .22. 
This value was not significantly less than one F (1,128) 
= 4.54, p > ns.
For the tests of the rating of the subsequently 
chosen candidate at time two, one F test was less than 
1.0. The inverse of the F value for the influence of 
affect on rating of subsequently chosen candidate at 
time two was .61. This value is not significantly less 
than 1.0, F(l,128) = 1.64, p = ns. For the tests of 
the average ratings of the subsequently unchosen 
candidates at time two, one F test was less than one. 
The inverse of the F value for the effect of affect on 
average ratings of subsequently unchosen candidates at
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time two was .31. This value is not significantly less 
than one £(1,128) = 3.23, p = ns.
In conclusion, only three of the seven F values 
less than 1.0 were statistically significantly lower 
than 1.0. Thus 3 of the 18 F-tests conducted in this 
study, or 16%, were significantly lower than 1.0. All 
three of the F values less than 1.0 were tests of the 
affect main effect. Two of these three occurred when a 
one-item measure of a dependent variable was used 
(regret and confidence). Also, in all three 
situations, the obtained means for each affect level 
were virtually identical and the standard deviations 
were larger. This is an unusual situation but the 
lower proportion of these results suggests that the 
assumptions of the F-test were not violated. 
Furthermore, Keppel (1982) downplays the importance of 
obtaining F values that are larger than 1.0. He states 
that when F values are lower than 1.0, the researcher 
need only to report F < 1.0 since no F value lower than 
1.0 can be significant.
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Discussion
The general purpose of this experiment was to 
determine if an individual's affective state would 
moderate the effect of valence of additional 
information in terms of the amount of post-decisional 
regret experienced, confidence levels, decision ratings 
and choices.
Overall, there were no significant effects of 
affective state on self-reports of regret or 
confidence; nor were there any significant results for 
ratings of alternatives or changes in alternative 
decision. However, the data showed strong support for 
the influence of the valence of additional information 
on changes in ratings of decision alternatives and on 
decision choice. Only one significant interaction was 
obtained (the rating of a previously chosen alternative 
after exposure to the independent variables).
Although results showed that the affect 
manipulation was effective and lasted for the duration 
of the experiment, it did not seem to affect the 
dependent variables in the main study. It is possible 
that the failure of the affect manipulation to produce 
significant effects was due to the task itself. The 
task of rating and choosing a new professor may not 
have carried personal relevance for these subjects.
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Deldin and Levin (1986) found significant mood effects 
for very personal decisions but not for less personal 
decisions. This could have implications relating to 
the present study. Although it was intended that the 
decision task in this study would be seen as important 
to the subjects individually, the majority of the 
subjects were not psychology majors and, thus, probably 
did not anticipate taking another psychology course in 
the future. This fact would have made the decision 
less personal to them and, according the Deldin and 
Levin, the affect condition would have less impact on 
their candidate ratings as well as their confidence and 
regret ratings.
Although affective state did not have a main 
effect on any of the dependent variables, it did 
interact with valence of additional information in the 
rating of a previously chosen candidate following 
exposure to the independent variables. There are a few 
possible explanations for this interaction. First of 
all, it is possible that subjects in the positive 
affect/negatively valenced additional information 
condition did not want to be perceived as having made a 
wrong decision and thus, when they had a chance to 
change their rating, they did. If this is the case, 
one would expect to find the same effect in the
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decision choice variable. It is possible, though, that 
subjects believed that changing their candidate choice 
would have been more obvious to others and then it 
might appear as though they were admitting fault for 
the poor decision. Again, research shows that subjects 
in positive affective states tend to avoid situations 
which could possibly decrease their affective state 
(Arkes, et al., 1988; Isen, et al., 1988) and so, avoid 
being perceived as wrong.
On the other hand, subjects in the neutral 
affect/negatively valenced additional information 
condition decreased their ratings of the previously 
chosen candidate less than those in the positive 
affective state. Subjects in the positive and neutral 
affect/neutrally valenced additional information 
conditions may have had no reason to change their 
ratings or choices. Those in the positive affect 
condition may have been happy with their previous 
decision and so were consistent in the second rating 
task. Those in the neutral affect condition may not 
have changed their ratings because that would take time 
and effort that they did not want to expend.
A plausible reason for this type of interaction 
not occurring in the case of regret and confidence 
ratings is the fact that if subjects were to admit that
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they had lost confidence and had feelings of regret 
because of a decision, they would be admitting to 
themselves and others that they had indeed made a wrong 
decision. If they do not admit to high regret and low 
confidence, they will feel that the decision error was 
not due to their own negligence and thus, they can 
maintain positive affect.
Another explanation for this interaction lies in 
the fact that people tend to judge others less severely 
if they are seen as similar to that judge (Burger,
1981). In this case, those in positive affective 
states would perceive themselves as possessing positive 
characteristics (Isen et al., 1978). They will then, 
after learning of the negative characteristics of the 
candidate they initially chose, perceive that candidate 
as less similar to themselves and consequently rate 
that candidate much lower than their initial rating and 
the rating of those subjects in the neutral affect 
condition. It is possible that those in the neutral 
affect condition did not recall as many positive 
characteristics of themselves and thus their 
perceptions of the candidate's characteristics were 
more similar to their own.
Also, Cialdini and Richardson (1980) and Amabile 
and Glazebrook (1982) found that when subjects are made
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to feel insecure or if their self-esteem is threatened, 
they will judge others more harshly and judge 
themselves or their group more leniently. In this 
experiment, those subjects in the positive affective 
condition may have felt their self-esteem was being 
threatened and consequently drastically lowered their 
rating of the previously chosen candidate. Finally, it 
is reasonable to assume that the subjects in the 
positive affect/negatively valenced additional 
information condition simply did not re-process the 
information regarding the candidate of their choice 
after receiving the feedback. Research shows that 
positive affect acts to motivate decision makers to 
avoid effortful processing of information as a means of 
mood maintenance (Isen, 1984). Also, Isen (1984, 1987) 
and Schwarz (1990) found that when faced with a 
decision, subjects in positive affective states tend to 
reach decisions more quickly, use less information, 
avoid demanding systematic processing of information 
and are more confident about their decision than those 
in negative affective states. Thus, subjects in the 
present study who were in the positive affect condition 
may have re-examined the old information about the 
candidate they previously rated after receiving 
negative information about that candidate. Instead,
Regret and Decision Making
94
they simply may have used the new information as a 
means of rating the candidate in the subsequent rating 
task. Conversely, the subjects in the neutral affect 
condition may have re-examined the characteristics of 
the candidate they had chosen previously after they 
received the negatively valenced additional information 
about that candidate. They subsequently integrated the 
new information with the original information and made 
their decisions accordingly. Thus, it is possible that 
they were not as harsh in their ratings as those 
subjects who simply used the new information in the 
rating task.
Discussion of Hypotheses
The predicted interaction of affect and valence of 
additional information on regret was not supported. 
Also, the main effects were not found to be 
significant. Although the reported feelings of regret 
were in the direction of the hypothesis with subjects 
in the negatively valenced additional information 
condition reporting more regret than those in the 
neutral information condition, these differences were 
not significant. It is possible that because subjects 
had no control over the information they were provided 
in the beginning, they did not regret making the wrong 
decision because they could not have known at the
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time that they were making the wrong decision.
According to Sugden (1985), one factor of regret is 
self-blame. The subjects in this experiment may have 
not blamed themselves for making the wrong decision 
since, in actuality, it was not their fault that they 
did not have all the information when they made the 
decision.
Another possible reason that subjects did not 
experience post-decisional regret when exposed to 
negatively valenced additional information was 
explained by Bell (1983). According to Bell, the 
degree of regret experienced by a decision maker 
depends upon whether or not the "lottery," or in this 
case the hiring of a new professor, is carried out or 
brought to the attention of the decision maker.
Subjects in the negatively valenced additional 
information condition may not have experienced feelings 
of regret because they did not know for sure whether or 
not their vote for the "poor" candidate actually 
contributed to the hiring of that candidate. In fact, 
it is highly possible that the subjects, in order to 
avoid feelings of regret for choosing the wrong 
candidate, engaged in the act of "diffusion of 
responsibility" (Latane & Darley, 1970). This may have 
been done by making themselves believe that their vote
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would not have affected the final choice for professor 
since there were so many other people voting. In other 
words, since the subjects were not told which candidate 
was ultimately hired, the outcome of their decision was 
left to speculation. Therefore, it was made possible 
for the subjects to engage in this "diffusion of 
responsibility" and not experience regret for their 
decision.
Next, the predicted interaction of affect and 
valence of additional information on confidence was not 
supported. Although the main effect of affect on 
confidence was non-significant, there was a marginal 
effect of additional information on confidence. There 
was a slight difference in confidence levels between 
those subjects in the different information conditions. 
Those in the negatively valenced additional information 
condition reported slightly less confidence in their 
decision than those in the neutrally valenced 
additional information condition. Again, this was not 
a significant effect but it was marginal. In 
actuality, the mean confidence levels of all conditions 
were between "100% confident" and "70% confident."
These are somewhat high confidence levels given the 
negatively valenced additional information that some 
subjects were exposed to. There are a few possible
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explanations for these high and stable confidence 
ratings. First of all, according to Gioffre and Lawson 
(1992), subjects tend to report more confidence in 
themselves and feel there is less risk involved in a 
decision when they believe the outcome will only affect 
them and not others. It is possible that the subjects 
believed that their one vote would not affect the 
hiring process of the new professor and thus their vote 
would not affect any other students. Therefore, they 
felt more confident in their decisions. Also, Zakay
(1985) demonstrated that post-decisional confidence 
ratings following cognitively simple decision processes 
were significantly higher than those ratings preceded 
by cognitively complex decision processes. The 
decision task involved in this study may have been 
cognitively simple for these subjects. Subjects were 
simply asked to review information provided to them and 
choose which candidate they preferred. If subjects 
did not feel personally involved in this decision, it 
may have been very simple for them. Thus, according to 
Zakay, confidence ratings should be higher in this 
situation.
Sniezek, Paese and Switzer, III (1990) found that 
confidence ratings are.generally inflated due to the 
methods of gathering this information. Most often
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questions that are positively framed ("What is the 
probability that your choice is correct?") tend to 
elicit more positive responses than if the question is 
negatively framed ("What is the probability that your 
choice is wrong?"). The confidence statements in this 
study were positively framed and therefore could have 
caused reports of higher confidence levels in subjects.
Although results show that confidence ratings were 
in the hypothesized direction, with subjects in the 
negatively valenced additional information condition 
reporting slightly less confidence in their choice and 
ratings than those in the neutrally valenced additional 
information condition, this was not a significant 
difference. This could be due to the fact that 
subjects are committed to maintain a somewhat 
consistent image. Geller and Pitz (1968) found that 
following disconfirming information regarding a 
previous choice, subjects demonstrated a definite 
resistance to decreasing their confidence ratings 
because of this commitment component. It is also 
possible that subjects did not take the task as 
seriously as anticipated and thus did not judge their 
confidence levels accurately. According to Janis and 
Mann (1977b) and Pflum and Brown (1984), if subjects 
are not under very much stress in the decision task,
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the task may not generate enough interest for the 
decision maker. This finding would explain interest 
problems of this study. It is highly unlikely that 
subjects experienced stress when making this decision. 
Thus, they did not have the interest level that would 
be desirable to make an accurate assessment of their 
confidence.
The third hypothesis, which predicted an 
interaction of affect and valence of additional 
information on the rating of the originally chosen 
candidate in the second rating task, was supported. As 
predicted, subjects in the positive affect and 
neutrally valenced additional information conditions 
tended to rate the previously chosen candidate the 
highest in the second decision task. Contrary to 
prediction, though, subjects in the positive affect and 
negatively valenced additional information conditions 
tended to rate the previously chosen candidate the 
lowest in the second decision task. There are a few 
possible explanations for this behavior. First, the 
negatively valenced additional information may have 
come as a complete surprise to subjects in the positive 
affective state. They were in a good mood and were not 
expecting such a let down. Thus, they may have been 
caught off guard.
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Affect, as a main effect, was not significant. 
There was, however, a significant main effect of 
valence of additional information. Subjects in the 
negatively valenced additional information condition 
rated the previously chosen candidate lower in the 
second decision task, and subjects in the neutrally 
valenced additional information condition rated the 
previously chosen candidate higher in the second 
decision task. This suggests that the neutrally 
valenced additional information may have given support 
to the subject's initial evaluation of the candidate's 
credentials. The negatively valenced additional 
information, however, did not support the subject's 
initial evaluation of the candidate's credentials.
This information caused the subjects to believe that 
the candidate of their choice had some negative 
characteristics that outweighed those credentials that 
were initially rated very highly.
The fourth hypothesis predicted an interaction of 
affect and valence of additional information on the 
average rating of the originally non-chosen candidates 
in the second rating task. This prediction was not 
supported. Although mean ratings of the unchosen 
candidates are in the hypothesized direction, they did 
not reach significance. It seems that, although
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valence of information had a main effect on the rating 
of the originally chosen candidate, the subjects may 
not have re-evaluated the other candidates but simply 
chose the next best candidate with a few minor 
adjustments in ratings. These results are not 
consistent with some past research. Research has found 
that positive affect motivates decision makers to avoid 
effortful processing (Isen, 1984), use less 
information, avoid demanding systematic processing and 
reach decisions more quickly (Isen, 1984, 1987;
Schwarz, 1990) Also, Clark & Isen, 1982) have found 
that negative affect motivates decision makers to 
search for information in order to alleviate the 
negative feeling. Also, past research has shown that 
response mode affects information search when making 
decisions (Billings & Scherer, 1991). Although the 
previous research does not support the findings of this 
study, there is some research that can explain the 
results of this study. It is highly possible that the 
negatively valenced additional information acted like 
negative feedback. Research has shown that subjects 
that receive negative feedback tend to lose intrinsic 
motivation for a task and place less importance on 
succeeding at the task (Deci & Ryan, 1980; Jussim, 
Coleman & Nassau, 1989).
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The predicted interaction of affect and additional 
information on the rating of the candidate chosen in 
the second rating task was not supported. There was, 
however, a significant main effect of valence of 
information on ratings. Subjects who had previously- 
received negatively valenced additional information 
regarding a past decision rated the subsequently chosen 
candidate lower than those who had previously received 
neutral information regarding a past decision. There 
was not a main effect, however, of the affect 
condition. This suggests that negatively valenced 
additional information regarding a past decision 
affects future decision making.
The sixth hypothesis predicted an interactive 
effect of affect and valence of information on average 
ratings of those candidates not chosen in the second 
rating task. This interaction prediction was not 
supported. The prediction of a main effect of affect 
was also not supported, however, there was a 
significant effect of valence of additional 
information. Those subjects who received negatively 
valenced additional information rated the subsequently 
non-chosen candidates in the second rating task 
significantly lower than those in the neutrally 
valenced additional information condition. Again, this
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suggests that decisional regret regarding a past 
decision affects future decision making. Subjects may 
have been afraid to give high ratings after receiving 
negative information in the past. They may have been 
concerned that, again, they did not have all the 
information available and thus were attempting to avoid 
regret in the future.
Finally, the predicted interaction of affect and 
additional information on the choice of candidate was 
not significant. Results demonstrated a significant 
main effect of the valence of information manipulation 
but not of the affect manipulation alone. This 
demonstrates that after receiving negatively valenced 
additional information, a significant number of 
subjects changed their recommendation for professor as 
compared to those who received neutrally valenced 
additional information regardless of their affective 
state. This result suggests that subjects, when given 
negatively valenced additional information regarding a 
past decision realized that their initial candidate 
choice was wrong and changed that choice when given the 
opportunity. According to Festinger (1957), the amount 
of dissonance present after making a decision is a 
direct function of the amount of conflict present 
before making that decision. Therefore, the more
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difficulty an individual has in making a decision 
between alternatives because of competing positive and 
negative characteristics, the greater the tendency to 
engage in cognitive dissonance reducing activities such 
as attempting to justify the previous decision. In 
this study, the subjects may not have had difficulty 
making the decision since, as was explained earlier, 
the decision task probably was not very personal to 
them and thus not very important.
In review, there was only one significant 
interaction effect of affect and additional 
information. This interaction was associated with the 
rating of the originally chosen candidate rated in the 
second decision task. The main effect of valence of 
additional information did not affect either regret or 
confidence levels but it did affect the final choice 
and all ratings of candidates except the average 
rating, in the second decision choice, of those 
candidates that were not chosen in the first decision 
choice. Finally, results demonstrate that affect did 
not have a significant main effect on any of the 
dependent variables.
There was no effect of any variable, main or 
interactive, on either regret or confidence ratings.
In fact, there was little difference between these
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ratings in any condition. The mean regret rating for 
all subjects was 3.96 with a standard deviation of only 
.89 and the mean confidence rating for all subjects was 
2.24 with a standard deviation of 1.26. Some reasons 
for these differences, along with other limitations of 
this study are discussed in the following section. 
Limitations
The primary goal of this study was to determine 
whether affect, or temporary mood, moderated the amount 
of post-decisional regret experienced by decision 
makers receiving additional information after making an 
irrevocable decision. It must be noted that individual 
trait affect may affect post-decisional regret and 
subsequent decision making differently than individual 
state affect.
Although pilot studies demonstrated that the comic 
strips induced positive affect states in subjects, some 
may argue that the subjects in the final experiment may 
have viewed the comic book task of reading the comics 
and noting on a piece of paper which comics they found 
to be the most amusing as a job. Research shows that a 
task that was once an enjoyment to the performer may 
not carry the same enjoyment level when the performer 
is told to carry out the task. In other words, if the 
researcher asks the subjects to perform a "job" which
Regret and Decision Making
106
includes a task that carries intrinsic rewards for the 
subject, that task will be seen as "work" and thus lose 
its rewarding factor to the subjects (Deci, 1975; Deci, 
Nezlek, & Sheinman, 1981; Lepper & Greene, 1975) . This 
fact was not found to be a problem in this study. 
Analysis shows that, in fact, subjects in the positive 
affect condition were in significantly more positive 
affective states after both neutrally valenced and 
negatively valenced additional information than those 
in the neutral affect condition. It is suggested, 
however, that future research avoid this potential 
problem by insuring that pilot studies and final 
experiment are exactly alike.
Another problem with the induction of positive 
affect and effectiveness of the comic strips may lie 
simply in the measurement of affective state. It would 
have been preferable to measure the affective state of 
each individual twice; once after the affect induction 
manipulation and once after the subjects are given the 
additional information. As it was, we only measured 
affective state after the additional information was 
given. This was done to avoid sensitization of the 
subjects. It was assumed that, as was shown in the 
pilot study, the affect induction manipulation actually 
changed the affective state of the subjects in the
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direction of the manipulation. Thus measuring 
affective state one time seemed sufficient given the 
problems that may have surfaced had the subjects 
"caught on" to the purpose of the experiment. As was 
stated earlier, subjects in the positive affect 
condition reported significantly higher affective 
states than those in the neutral affect condition, but 
it is advised that future research use an affect 
measure twice if at all possible.
Another measurement problem inherent in this study 
was that of regret and confidence. It is likely that 
the experiment did not utilize the optimal method of 
measurement for regret and confidence. Neither of 
these measures were created in a manner that allowed 
for the measurement of reliability. Both measures were 
single-item measures, thus, internal consistency was 
not appropriate. Both measures were given to subjects 
at two different times but two different manipulations 
were present between the measures. Thus, test-retest 
reliability was also inappropriate.
Thus far in the literature there has been no 
direct measure of regret. This is not surprising as 
there is still no definite, agreed upon definition of 
regret. Once regret is identified specifically, it 
will become more clear as to how to measure this
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concept. Until that time, we must utilize our research 
and knowledge to attempt to find the best measure of 
regret as we understand it.
Another problem with the measurement of regret 
stems from the fact that it is possible that people in 
different affective states deal with regret differently 
rather than feel regret differently. We may all feel 
regret in the same manner, but some may deal with it 
through verbalization or actions whereas others may 
keep their feelings to themselves and thus "stew" in 
their feelings of regret. These different processes of 
dealing with regret may have caused subjects to respond 
differently on the questionnaire. Some may have chosen 
to hide their feelings in an attempt to "save face" 
whereas others may have verbalized their feelings of 
regret in order to relieve themselves of this feeling.
Aside from measurement problems and affect state 
induction problems, the "main task" of this study, 
rating and choosing candidates for professor, may 
itself pose a problem. First of all, the difference 
between the computer information given and the 
information given to subjects on cards may be a factor 
in subjects' decisions. Subjects were first asked to 
review candidate credentials via a computer program.
The candidates and their credentials were presented
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in a computer display. In the second task, subjects 
were asked to review the credentials of the candidates 
which were given to them on a typed 8 1/2 x 11 piece of 
paper. "Although this might be a minor difference, 
task and display effects can be powerful and it is 
important to show that response mode effects are 
robust" (Payne, 1982). Future research should attempt 
to keep response mode effects equal to ensure that the 
minor details do not bias the results of the 
experiment.
Secondly, the subjects' involvement with the task 
may have also played a role in their decision making. 
Although an attempt was made to create an important 
decision task, the fact remains that this was a 
laboratory study and it is highly possible that the 
subjects did not take the study as seriously as the 
experiment intended. It is also possible that the 
subjects did not believe the task of selection of a 
professor was very important. Although all of the 
subjects were enrolled in a psychology course, many 
were not psychology majors and it is possible that many 
did not anticipate taking another psychology course 
again and thus, the decision would lack personal 
importance and consequence. Also, the task was 
anonymous. The subjects knew that their decision could
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not be linked to them and thus did not feel pressured 
to make a sound decision. Had this been a highly 
important personal decision to subjects, I believe 
there would have been a significant effect of affective 
state and additional information condition on post- 
decisional regret. The more involved the subjects were 
in this decision, the more regret they would have 
experienced.
Because this decision may not have been important 
to subjects, this study may lack ecological validity. 
Although this may be the case, the study will still 
have internal validity. Because of the use of random 
assignment, it is safe to say that all conditions were 
equal. It is most likely that all subjects had a lower 
effect from the independent variables but the direction 
or effect of these independent variables on the 
dependent variables was different between conditions. 
All groups should have been affected the same and thus, 
although the magnitude of the effect may be more 
modest, the directions should all be the same as if the 
task was regarded as highly important.
The question remains - had the subjects believed 
this was indeed an important decision, would they have 
been affected more by the affect and information 
conditions? According to the research, in this type of
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study where many people are involved in making a single 
decision and where the subjects know that others are 
involved in making that decision, subjects will not 
feel regret or remorse for poor decision making (Brown, 
1986). Brown (1986) states that when people have "done 
things their own consciences could not approve" (p.
173), they will engage in self-serving bias techniques. 
They will deny any responsibility for their actions or 
the outcome and blame the situation. Also, researchers 
have found that when working within groups, not unlike 
the situation of this study, individuals will engage in 
diffusion of responsibility (Darley & Latane, 1968). 
Their production, or in this case, the effort they put 
into a task, will decrease because they know that their 
individual production or effort cannot be identified 
(Williams, Harkins, & Latane, 1981). Also, although 
they made a poor decision, they may not necessarily 
be held accountable for that decision (Burger, 1981; 
Brown, 1986; Harkins & Jackson, 1985; Kerr & Bruun, 
1981; Simonson & Nye, 1992). According to Brown
(1986), although an actor's actions led to a particular 
negative outcome, if that person did not intend for 
that outcome to occur, he or she may not be held 
accountable. In the case of this study, subjects may 
have not experienced post-decisional regret for the
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mere fact that they did not feel they were responsible 
for their previous poor decision. They had, after all, 
made the best decision they could have made given the 
information available at the time of that decision.
Even though they realized that the "wrong" candidate 
may be chosen for professor partially due to their 
vote, they also realized that they could not be held 
accountable for their poor decision.
Also, it is possible that if the outcome of the 
decision were made more salient to the subjects, the 
negatively valenced additional information may have 
produced significant results as far as post-decisional 
regret and confidence ratings are concerned. In order 
for subjects to experience post-decisional regret, they 
must experience a negative outcome. It was assumed in 
this study that the negatively valenced additional 
information would work as a negative outcome, but it is 
possible that subjects were able to talk themselves out 
of the feeling of regret for making a "wrong" decision 
by making themselves believe that the choice they made 
did not affect the final professor choice.
On the other hand, according to the data, the 
valence of the additional information did not operate 
via the regret/confidence mechanism. Since no effect 
was found for the independent variables on self-
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reported feelings of regret and confidence, but effects 
were found for candidate ratings and choice, it is 
apparent that feedback affects future decision making 
although, not through regret and confidence. A note of 
caution should be taken with these results, though, 
since regret and confidence ratings were self-report 
ratings. It is possible that subjects, for reasons of 
ego, self-esteem, self-presentation, etc., did not 
accurately report their feelings of regret and 
confidence. Therefore, these variables may have 
actually been involved in the change in decisions but 
not accurately reported. On the other hand, it is 
highly possible that decision changes were actually 
direct results of the negative feedback given.
According to most drive theories, decisions concerning 
present behavior are based primarily on the 
consequences of past behavior (see Allport, 1954; 
Thorndike, 1911). These theories state that if past 
actions lead to negative consequences or punishment, 
individuals will tend to avoid repeating them. 
Researchers soon began introducing concepts to explain 
this behavior such as "homeostasis" (Cannon, 193 9)
"law of effect" (Thorndike, 1911), and "drive" 
(Woodworth, 1918). The basic premise of all these 
explanations is that people have goals or drives. When
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these goals aren't met, they experience a state of 
disequilibrium and do what needs to be done in order to 
return to their normal state. Thus, when feedback is 
negative, people will automatically (instinctively) 
change their decision in order to reach their goals 
(Woodworth, 1918).
Finally, subjects' involvement in the study and 
their affective states may also have affected their 
information search processes. In fact, it is possible 
that rather than moods affecting post-decisional regret 
and decision making directly, they may affect 
information gathering directly, thus affecting the 
decision itself indirectly. For example, subjects in 
one condition may study the candidate credentials more 
carefully than others. Through their thorough search 
of information, those subjects may actually uncover 
some characteristics that would lead them to choose a 
different candidate than those who quickly review the 
credentials. This may, in turn, cause those subjects 
who reviewed the candidate credentials thoroughly to 
not change candidate ratings and choice regardless of 
the type of additional information they received 
because of their thorough understanding of each of the 
candidate's credentials.
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Conclusions 
The results of this study lead to several 
different conclusions. First of all, when making a 
decision similar to or the same as a previous decision 
given additional information regarding that decision, 
if the additional information is negatively valenced, 
it is very likely that the decision maker may alter his 
or her previous opinions about aspects of that decision 
and make the decision at hand differently. Also, 
an individual will tend to be more conservative in 
their future decision making because of the past 
decisional consequences experienced. Whether or not 
this is a long-lasting effect still needs to be 
examined, but for purposes of constant decision making, 
it seems apparent that the experience of negatively 
valanced additional information has an effect on the 
individual's future decision processes.
Although the decision maker receives negatively 
valenced additional information regarding the previous 
decision, results demonstrate that the decision maker 
will not significantly lose confidence in his or her 
decision making capabilities. Although, this could be 
due to the measurement used in this study. Had a more 
valid measure of confidence been used, we may have 
found confidence to decrease upon receipt of negatively
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valenced additional information in the neutral 
affective states. Since it was found that ratings 
change and tend to decrease in subsequent decision 
tasks when given negatively valenced additional 
information, it seems that there would be some 
confidence loss also. This is a variable that must be 
studied further in order to get to the truth. Also, 
results suggest that simply because the decision maker 
changed his or her opinions about the aspects of the 
decision task and changed his or her decision if given 
the chance, this does not mean that the decision maker 
will report decisional regret. I do believe, though, 
had the regret measure been more reliable and valid, 
regret would have been found to be a significant effect 
of negatively valenced additional information.
One possible explanation for the small number of 
significant effects found is that the levels of the 
independent variables were somewhat subtle. For 
example, the difference between levels of affective 
state were neutral versus positive. It is very 
difficult to distinguish between two such levels. Had 
we utilized positive, neutral and negative affective 
states, I believe that we would have found more 
significant main effects of affective state and also 
more significant interaction effects. One complication
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with using negative affective states is that there are 
many different types of negative affectivity. We would 
have to ensure that all subjects were experiencing the 
same negative affectivity, anger or sadness, since it 
is more than likely that these different negative 
states produce different behaviors.
Also, the additional information level differences 
were very subtle. The levels were neutral versus 
negative. Again, had we been able to utilize negative, 
neutral, and positive, I believe we would have found 
more significant effects.
Implications for Future Research
A follow-up study to this would, in my opinion, 
lead to more significant effects if the following 
precautions were taken. First of all, it is important 
that the decision task presented to the subjects is of 
high importance to those subjects. It must also be an 
irrevocable decision. Also, it is important that the 
decisions are made as soon as possible after the 
manipulations, especially that of affect, to insure 
that the manipulations are still affecting the 
subjects during the decision task. As far as the 
measurement of dependent variables is concerned, there 
must be a better measurement of regret and confidence 
utilized in following research. With these problems
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controlled, the chances of finding significant effects 
will be greatly increased.
Also, Sugden (1985) states that regret is 
partially a function of the amount of blame individuals 
place on themselves. It is possible that subjects in 
this experiment did not experience a strong feeling of 
regret because additional information was not available 
to them at the time of the original decision. Future 
research could attempt to manipulate the culpability 
aspect in the original decision (provide a lot of 
information about alternatives that subjects would 
choose to search or not). Thus, subjects would be more 
likely to blame themselves, and experience regret, for 
a poor decision if they did not search all the 
available information.
As for the whole area of post-decisional regret, 
there is much room for further research. Very little 
research has focused on decisional regret along with 
other variables. It would be very interesting to see 
how subjects would react to a situation similar to the 
one presented in this study but while utilizing a 
decision task that is very personal and important to 
the subjects. If using college students as subjects, 
some ideas that come to mind are decisions that affect 
the following: class grades, year of graduation, and
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chances of getting a job in their major area of study. 
These would be difficult tasks to carry out but would 
be much more personal to the subjects. Also, it would 
be interesting to see if subjects who are in positive 
affective states would remain in positive affective 
states after receiving negatively valenced additional 
information about a very personal and important 
decision.
Again, it would be useful to use more distinct 
levels of the independent variables such as positive, 
neutral and negative affectivity and positive, neutral, 
and negatively valenced additional information. The 
more specific researchers can be with the independent, 
and also dependent variables, the better able we will 
be to detect differences in confidence, decisional 
regret, and decision choices. Once we are able to 
perfect the manipulations and measurements in the labs, 
we can then move into the field.
A field study could be more helpful and practical 
if it were within the organizational setting itself.
It would be very interesting to go into the field and 
be able to manipulate affective state and additional 
information regarding a past decision while observing 
how it affects the decision maker's future affective 
states and future decision making effectiveness. It
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would also be interesting to see if the subjects lose 
confidence in their decision making abilities and if 
so, if their future decision making ability is actually 
affected.
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APPENDIX A 
Teaching Characteristics Generated
Allows students to take make-up exams.
Seems to be bored with his or her job.
Reviews material before exam.
Requires a lot of reading.
Allows for extra credit.
Gives difficult exams.
Grades on a curve.
Speaks in a very monotone manner.
Likes to joke around with the class.
Lectures in addition to the book assignments.
Asks for class participation in discussions.
Gives essay examinations.
Has no attendance requirements.
Less than three exams throughout the semester.
Drops lowest test score.
Grades are based on more than test scores (attendance, 
assignments, participation)
Uses examples in lecture.
Comes to class prepared.
Lectures are easy to understand.
Lectures directly from his notes.
Gives long exams.
Talks about himself and his family.
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Tests are a mixture of essay, multiple 
choice, and fill in the blank.
Gives quizzes between exams.
Has no attendance requirements.
Requires students to write a research paper.
Does not review before exams.
Assigns little out of class reading.
Gives multiple choice examinations.
Seems to be excited about subject matter.
Writes out lecture outlines for students.
Lectures completely over the book.
Lets class out early.
Is a hard grader.
Grades based on exam scores only.
Dresses professionally.
Lectures are boring.
Lectures very quickly.
Lectures very slowly.
Has strict attendance requirements.
Does not use a curve for grading.
Willing to help students outside of class.
Keeps class past scheduled class time.
Gives more than three exams during the semester.
Chooses interesting books for class.
Is friendly.
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Tests are representative of class material.
Dresses sloppily.
Is knowledgable about subject matter.
Lets class out at its scheduled time.
Repeats important points in different ways.
Talks in technical terms.
Is frequently late for class.
Gives out home phone number.
Has flexible office hours.
Asks difficult test questions.
Does not review before exams.
Is responsive to student suggestions.
Arrives to class on time.
Is frequently unprepared for class.
Does not use a curve for grading.
No extra credit is allowed.
Has little patience with students.
Teaches in a very professional and businesslike manner. 
Gives essay examinations.
Lectures only, no class participation is required.
Is an easy grader.
Enjoys his or her job.
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APPENDIX B 
Teacher Characteristic Rating Scale 
Please read the following characteristics of 
teaching assistants personalities, teaching methods, 
grading methods, etc. and rate them using the scale 
given below.
Do not put your name on this form. You may quit
this survey at any time.
_____  What is your age?
1. Like very much in a teacher
2. Like a little in a teacher
3. Doesn't affect liking one way or another
4. Dislike a little in a teacher
5. Dislike very much in a teacher
_____  Allows students to take make-up exams.
_____  Seems to be bored with his or her job.
_____  Reviews material before exam.
_____  Requires a lot of reading.
_____  Allows for extra credit.
_____  Gives difficult exams.
Grades on a curve.
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Speaks in a very monotone manner.
Likes to joke around with the class.
Lectures in addition to the book assignments. 
Asks for class participation in discussions. 
Gives essay examinations.
Has no attendance requirements.
Less than three exams throughout the 
semester.
Drops lowest test score.
Grades are based on more than test scores 
(attendance, assignments, participation)
Uses examples in lecture.
Comes to class prepared.
Lectures are easy to understand.
Lectures directly from his notes.
Gives long exams.
Talks about himself and his family.
Tests are a mixture of essay, multiple 
choice, and fill in the blank.
Gives quizzes between exams.
Has no attendance requirements.
Requires students to write a research paper.
Does not review before exams.
Assigns little out of class reading.
Gives multiple choice examinations.
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Seems to be excited about subject matter.
Writes out lecture outlines for students. 
Lectures completely over the book.
Lets class out early.
Is a hard grader.
Grades based on exam scores only.
Dresses professionally.
Lectures are boring.
Lectures very quickly.
Lectures very slowly.
Has strict attendance requirements.
Does not use a curve for grading.
Willing to help students outside of class.
Keeps class past scheduled class time.
Gives more than three exams during the 
semester.
Chooses interesting books for class.
Is friendly.
Tests are representative of class material. 
Dresses sloppily.
Is knowledgable about subject matter.
Lets class out at its scheduled time.
Repeats important points in different ways.
Talks in technical terms.
Is frequently late for class.
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Gives out home phone number.
Has flexible office hours.
Asks difficult test questions.
Does not review before exams.
Is responsive to student suggestions.
Arrives to class on time.
Is frequently unprepared for class.
Does not use a curve for grading.
No extra credit is allowed.
Has little patience with students.
Teaches in a very professional and 
businesslike manner.
Gives essay examinations.
Lectures only, no class participation is 
required.
Is an easy grader.
Enjoys his or her job.
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APPENDIX C 
College Students: How They Are Feeling 
This survey is intended to assess the general 
affective state of average college students. Please be 
as truthful as possible as these results will be used 
in future descriptive analyses.
Please do not put your name on this form as it is 
intended to be completely anonymous. You may quit this 
survey at any time.
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Please indicate to what extent you feel this way 
right now, that is, at the present moment. using the 
scale provided below. Please mark your answer sheet 
with the number which corresponds to your present 
feelings. For example, if you are feeling extremely 
happy, you would mark a "10".
1. Sad 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Happy
2 . Depressed 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Upbeat
3 . Displeased 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Pleased
4 . Disappointed 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Delighted
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Please indicate to what extent you have felt this 
way during the oast few weeks using the scale provided 
below.
1 . Sad 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Happy
2 . Depressed 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Upbeat
3 . Displeased 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Pleased
4 . Disappointed 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Delighted
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Please indicate to what extent you generally feel 
this way, that is, how you feel on the average, using 
the scale provided below.
1. Sad
2. Depressed
3. Displeased
4. Disappointed
1 2 3 4 5 6 18 9
1 2 3 4 5 618 9
1 2 3 4 5 618 9
1 2 3 4 5 618 9
10 Happy
10 Upbeat
10 Pleased
10 Delighted
(Based on Scherer, 1989)
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APPENDIX D
CANADA’S SUPPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS 
PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS
BY
A H M E D  S H E I K H
Pennsylvania State University
W HAT the U n ited  Nations can am ount to or w hat it is capable o f  doing 
u ltim ately  rests upon the governm ents o f  its m em ber states. Since its 
in cep tion , o n ly  a very small num ber o f  its m em bers have identified them­
selves very c lose ly  w ith  the cause o f  U N  peace-keeping. This close identification has 
developed  to the p o in t where it w ill n ot be w ro n g  to say that the success o f  U N  
peace-keeping is regarded in these countries as a source o f  satisfaction o f  national 
interest.
It is submicced that the Canadian record .o f U N  peace-keeping operations’ support, 
in general, and its financial support in particular, provides sufficient evidence to place 
Canada in the list o f  those very few  countries to w h o m  the U N  ow es much. The 
record indicates the Canadian policy on  the financing o f  the U N  peace-keeping 
operations has been alm ost exclusively guided b y  its deep and unrem itting conviction  
that U N  peace-keep ing activities have m uch to contribute tow ards m aintaining inter­
national peace and security. Out o f  this con viction  has em erged a national policy o f  
strong support o f  the U N  in this area— a policy  w h ich  is largely principle-oriented, 
w h ich  aims at a sharp delineation o f  a few  im portant principles, w h ile  allow ing con­
siderable latitude in their application. -
It is further subm itted  that over the past dozen  years or so Canada has also con­
sistently pursued a p o licy  towards U N  peace-keeping w h ich  is n o t on ly  aimed at 
preserving the U N  but also at satisfying the interests o f  the international com m unity, 
as these are perceived  b y  Canada. In do in g  so, Canada feels that the interests o fits  ow n  
citizens are also satisfied.
W h at fo llow s in  this b rief article is an attem pt to provide som e documentary 
evidence from  the C anadian foreign po licy  pronouncem ents as recorded in the official 
records o f  the U n ited  N ations and elsew here, in support o f  the con ten tion  that Canada 
has a strong interest in seeing the U N  continue its peace-keeping activities, and has 
provided strong support to the U N  tow ards m aintaining and en larging this area o f  
activ ity . Canada has done this largely b y  em phasising frugality and financial fairness 
for the benefit o f  its national citizens, w h ile  at the sam e tim e w arn ing  the member 
states that frugality cannot be purchased at the expense o f  abdication from crucial 
international duties— the m ost im portant o f  w h ich , from  the C anadian point o f  v iew , 
is their role in h elp ing  the U nited N ations, financially, to keep the peace.
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E V I D E N C E
A recent debate in  the Canadian H ouse o f  C om m on s indicated that the G overn­
ment has n o w  arrived at the conclusion that an inflexib le adherence to the principles 
o f  sound international la w  or the law  o f  the U N  Charter leads to risky international 
politics w h en  it com es to forcing the nations to contribute tow ards financing those 
international peace-k eep in g  operations that they op p osed . T h is con clu sion  resulted in 
Canada’s announcem ent on  21 June 1965 that it w ill n o  lo n g er  insist that all U N  
members be forced to pay their full share o f  the assessed cost o f  U N E F  and O N U C  
operations.1 It further announced that the G overnm ent w o u ld  don ate $ 4  m illion  to  
help liquidate the O rgan ization’s deficit incurred because o f  the Russian and French 
refusal to h on ou r their ob ligations.2
This announcem ent virtually  m eant the reversal o f  an earlier p o licy  w h ich  Canada 
had fo llow ed  for a lm ost a decade. T he Canadians m ade n o  secret o f  the fact that this 
change was caused b y  their fear that a rigorous application o f  the principle o f  com pul­
sory paym ent for these tw o  operations m ight force the S ov ie t U n io n , its allies, and 
France to w ith d raw  from  the U N  and thus cause its d estru ction .3
T he financial h istory  o f  the U N  peace-keeping operations can be rou gh ly  divided  
into three phases for analytical purposes:
1. 1946 to 1955: D u r in g  this period all U N  ‘peace-keeping operations’ (a term  w hich  
did not actually  co m e into com m on  usage until the 1956 Suez crisis) were sup­
posedly financed under the rule o f  com pulsory assessment o f  all U N  m em bers. 
There w ere objections to this rule, how ever, even  during this period by som e  
nations. It is interesting to note that the single en forcem en t action during this 
tim e— the K orean  conflict— was financed com p lete ly  th rou gh  vo lu n tary  contri­
butions, m o stly  A m erican.
2. December 1956 to December 1962: T his period can be readily classified as one o f  
perm anent trouble in this area. Here one finds the b eg in n in g  o f  the challenges to  
the iu le  o f  co m p u lso ry  paym ent b y  a num ber o f  states. It ended w ith  the formal 
and o v erw h e lm in g  acceptance by the General A ssem bly  o f  an O p in io n  by the 
International C ou rt upholding the defenders o f  this princip le.
3. 1962 to the present: T his period can be characterised b y  a reluctant and grudging  
abandonm ent o f  this principle b y  the U nited  States and other W estern  allies in
• the face o f  Franco-R ussian pressure and the reluctance o f  sm aller countries to  
force the issue in  the General A ssem bly through the application o f  Article 19. 
H ow ever , there is no m utually acceptable agreem ent or so lu tion  in sight.
T h e m ain em phasis o f  this analysis, therefore, w ill largely  fall up on  an exam ination  
o f  the financial aspects o f  Canadian peace-keeping p o licy  during the crucial years o f  
the second period , that is, from  1956 to 1962, and the third p eriod  from  1962 to the  
present.
Since the estab lishm ent o f  the U nited  N ations, tw o  m ajor principles have guided  
Canadian p o licy  tow ard  U N  finances. W ith  the establishm ent o f  U N E F  in 1956, a 
third principle w as added. T he three principles are: (i) frugality , w h ich  m eans that the
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U n ited  Nations should  spend m oderately in  the ligh t o f i t s  m odest resources, (ii) fair 
shares, w h ich  means that the m em ber states' shares o f  U N  expenses be fairly assessed 
in  the ligh t o f  their capacity to pay, (iii) universal and com p u lsory  payments for 
peace-keeping operations. It is possible to analyse the C anadian-policy  through the 
in teraction  and consequences o f  these three principles.
A s early as 1946 the Canadian delegate to the U N  concluded  his speech w ith  the 
advice that the O rganization should practice eco n o m y  b y  operating w ith in  its means.4 
S o o n  after that the Canadian G overnm ent sent a letter to the U N  pleading that thr 
U N  should be protected from  financial bankruptcy b y  keeping its costs ‘as lo w  as 
possib le’, and b y  tightening its rules o f  procedure dealing w ith  the O rganization’s 
financial aspects.5 Canada further argued that there w as a certain am ount o f  financial 
irresponsibility exhibited  inj actual U N  procedures,6 and rem inded the Organization 
that according to the provisional regulations o f  the U n ited  N a tio n s,7 all but one o f  the 
U N ’s policy-m aking bodies w ere d istin ctively  forbidden to m ake any decisions or 
co m m itm en ts in vo lv in g  financial ob ligations, w ith o u t a com prehensive prior know l­
ed g e  o f  the extent o f  such com m itm ents and the precise source o f  funds to meet 
th em .8 Still later, it was Canada that to o k  the in itiative in proposing that just such 
restrictions should also be extended to the G eneral A ssem bly .9 W ith o u t any significant 
changes or opposition the Canadian proposal w as adopted b y  the U N .10 Conse­
q u en tly , since 1948 the U nited  N ations has had strict regulations governing the 
authorisation o f  U N  operations in any field  w h ich  w ere to be financed through a 
com p u lsory  assessment o f  the entire m em b ersh ip .11 In the area o f ‘maintenance o f  
peace and security’ a concession was m ade, that is, an am ount o f  S z  m illion may be 
spent on  a ‘peace-keeping’ operation w ith o u t the prior approval and appropriation o f  
the General Assem bly ( if  the A ssem bly is n o t in session) provided  the Secretary- 
G eneral certifies the fact that the funds are urgently  needed for the purpose stated.12. 
For an a'mounc in excess o f  this, he is required, under all circum stances, to obtain prior 
approval o f  the A dvisory C om m ittee on A dm inistrative and B u d getary  Questions. 
In the years that fo llow ed , Canada con tin u ed  to poin t out the weaknesses in the 
O rganization’s financial procedures w h ich  have been period ically  corrected .1- Despite 
its o w n  econom y drive, it is interesting to n ote  that Canada w as the first country to 
sco ld  b ig  and rich nations such as the U S S R , the U n ited  K in gd om , and France for not 
p ro v id in g  ample funds to the U N  in its effort to p rom ote peace and stability in the 
d ev elo p in g  nations.14
A rriving at the 1956 Suez crisis, it is again interesting to note that it was a Canadian 
leader w h o  proposed the concept o f  a U n ited  N ation s police force, and it was the 
C anadian delegate w h o  contended that despite the expensiveness o f  the U N E F  it must 
b e  strongly  supported, for there is no activ ity  m ore crucial to the spirit o f  the Charter 
and the purposes o f  the U N  than the establishm ent and m aintenance o f  peace in any 
part o f  the w orld .15 In i9 6 0 , at the tim e the O N U C  w as being  set up, the Canadian 
d elegate supported it and pointed out that $ 6 0  m illion  for the C o n g o  operation—• 
th o u g h  larger than the entire regular b u d get o f  the O rganization  for that year— was a
Regret and Decision Making
153
C a n a d a ’ s s u p p o r t  o f  u . n . p e a c e - k e e p i n g  o p e r a t i o n s
very sm all sum  com pared to the cost o f  a real w ar i f  it w as to break out should the 
O N U C  n ot be established.16 D uring the initial stages o f  the U N E F , it was again  
Canada w h o  urged the m em ber states donating troops to the Force to be extrem ely  
modesc in their financial claims on the O rganization in  order not to burden the U N  
m achinery beyon d  its financial capability .17 In other w ord s, Canada favoured a p o licy  
offru ga licy  but not to the point o f  restricting the exp an d in g  use o f  the U N  in the area 
o f  peace-keeping. It was Canada’s b e lie f that if  the U N  w as to survive, it must m eet the 
challenge o f  international conflicts such as the Suez crisis b y  raising ‘expensive’ U N  
forces under the concept o f  ‘necessary expenditures’ and Canada supported the U N  
in this endeavour, w hile the other countries, according to Canada, are still lagging  
behind on  this point even today.18 Canada’s strong desire to support the U N  in the 
U N E F  operation  was also manifested by its principle o f  flexibility . Therefore, in  
1956, M r Pearson was able to anjue: ‘su re ly ... the m ost urgent and im m ediate d uty  
for us is to get the U N E F  into E gyp t w ith ou t d e la y ’. 19 F o llow in g  M r Pearson’s 
declaration, the Canadian delegate was able to advise the U N  B u d get C om m ittee that 
Canada was extrem ely  interested in seeing the U N  d ev e lo p  its peace-keeping capacity  
and ‘did n ot w ish  financial considerations to interfere w ith  the harm onious w ork in g’ 
o f  the U N E F  or the U N  as a w hole in this area.20
F o llo w in g  the establishm ent o f  the U N E F , the Secretary-G eneral proposed that all 
those expenses for the Force w hich are not borne by .the states donating the troops and 
equipm ent should  be financed oucside the norm al b u d get o f  the U N . It was Canada 
w h o  p o in ted  ou t the inherent dangers in such a proposal— nam ely, som e nations 
m ight find it easier to refuse to pay a special assessment than their'regular share o f  the 
assessment for running the O rganization. B ut, reluctantly, w ith  som e reservations, 
the Canadians accepted the Secretary-General’s proposal and voted  for it, hoping the 
nations w o u ld  after all pay their shares in the interest o f  international peace.21 It was 
the first m istake Canada made in this area, for, as it turned out, the Canadians’ strong  
convictions o f  international peace through U N  peace-keep ing were n o t shared b y  
m any. T h e Secrecary-General’s proposal was adopted by a General Assem bly reso­
lution w h ich  Canada supported.22 T h e actual appropriations w hich established the 
special account and stated its initial size w ere made several w eeks later and had Canad­
ian support.23 S om e three to four years later w h en  it becam e clear that the Soviet 
U n ion  and m any other countries w ere not w illin g  to pay  their share o f  U N E F  
expenses, it was the Canadian delegate w h o  first adm itted  that the U N  financial 
form ula o f  special funds was a m istake.24 But the precedent was set and it was too late 
for the O N U C  n ot to have a special fund as w ell. It w ill  be rem em bered that O N U C  
was also financed through a special account w ith  all the weaknesses inherent in the 
financing o f  U N E F , primarily because o f  the U N E F  precedent. D espite the efforts o f  
the Secretary-G eneral to include the first year’s expenses o f  the O N U C  in the regular 
budget as an item  in the supplem entary estimates,25 the General A ssem bly refused to 
do so .26 In the m eantim e the problem  o f  a ‘just’ scale o f  assessment for the expenses o f  
these tw o  forces becam e crucial, and w orst o f  all was the fact that even those countries
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w h o  promised to pay  took  their o w n  tim e in d o in g  so , thus m u ltip ly in g  the financial 
problem s o f  the U N .27
In the years that have fo llow ed these tw o  operations, U N  debates have usually 
centred around the question: W h o  shall pay, and h o w  m uch? Since 1956, many 
suggestions have been m ade— suggestions such as: ‘T he aggressors should pay’;28 'the 
permanent mem bers o f  the C ouncil should pay*;29 ‘the countries profiting economi. 
cally from  an operation  should p ay’; 30 ‘the rich nations should  p a y ’;31 and so on. 
Three points should be noted w ith  regard to suggestions for the paym ent o f  U N  
peace-keeping operations: (i) the fact that U N  decisions to establish peace-keeping 
forces have been supported b y  vast m ajorities because o f  the need for urgent action 
should not be taken to  m ean that the vast m ajority o f  states feel equally w illing to pay 
for these operations; (ii) several m em bers have been able to rationalise their opposition 
to com pulsory p aym ent by arguing that since it was necessary to create special ac­
counts for these tw o  operations it seem s fair that contributions to these accounts 
should not have the sam e strong com p u lsory  ob ligation  as the regular assessment for 
annual budget; (iii) som e poor countries have argued that since these expenses arc 
considered extraordinary and special, a special scale o f  assessm ent (obviously benefit­
ing  only the poor) should  be considered.
In the face o f  the ab ove, an analysis o f  C anada’s record indicates that that country 
has vigorously and consistently argued that peace and security is a collective responsi­
b ility  and therefore the cost o f  U N  peace-keeping operations m ust be shared on a 
com pulsory paym ent basis. The Canadian Prim e M inister w arned in the strongest 
terms that the U N  w o u ld  be rendered useless i f  the principle o f  com pulsory payment 
was to be abandoned. M r Pearson argued:
T he real issue. . .  is that, i f  the U n ited  N ations decides in accordance w ith  recognized 
and legal procedures to engage in peace-keeping operations, the expenses should be- 
borne collectively b y  the whole- m em bership in accordance w ith  Assem bly deci­
sions on apportionm ent. There is surely n o  other acceptable w ay . I f  w e  do not give  
the Organization the financial support w h ich  it needs for discharging its responsi­
bilities, its very existence w ill be en d a n g ered ... T he first concern o f  the United  
N ation s. . .  is the keeping o f  peace. I f  w e  w ere to fail in  that, the w h o le  brave human 
experim ent w ou ld  have failed; w e  w ou ld  g o  d ow n  for g o o d .32
Canada’s support o f  U N  peace-keeping operations, as exem p lified  by statements 
such as the above, failed to persuade the m ajority o f  the m em bers to accept com pul­
sory payments. In fact, the present writer w o u ld  argue that the v o tin g  pattern on  
financial resolutions for the U N E F  and the O N U C  clearly indicates that a great many 
m em bers, while supporting the U N  peace-keeping program m e in general, are not as 
strongly m otivated in their financial support as Canada has been over the years.33 
Realising this, in fact, the Canadian Foreign M inister on ce  clearly stated that C a n a d a  
attached a high degree o f  significance to U N  peace-keep ing operations w hich is not 
to be found in m any other countries.34
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t- It is interesting to note that on ce it becam e apparent that the con cep t o f  com pulsory  
paym ent was doing m ore harm  than good  to future U N  peace-keep ing  operations, 
Canada’s strong support o f  this principle began  to change. B y  1961, Canada w as  
ready to support a specific proposal put forward b y  M exico  and Brazil asking for an 
authoritative statem ent o n  this matter. In fact, it  was Canada w h ich  introduced a 
resolution for that purpose.35 A t the same tim e Canada conducted  a v igorou s cam ­
paign in favour o f  subm itting the issue to the International C ourt o f  Justice, suggest­
ing that the on ly  course op en  to the m em ber states, i f  they w ished to save the O rgan i­
zation from  further disunity, w as to subm it the issue to the C ou rt.36 It w as d isappoint­
ing for Canada to see that the General A ssem bly decided to do that o n ly  by a sm all 
majority, a vote  o f  52 for and 43 either votin g  against the proposal or abstaining.37 
Canada was also one o f  the tw en ty-th ree nations w h o  subm itted w ritten  statem ents to  
the Court and it was one o f  e igh t nations w hich  made oral presentations before the 
Court. The C ourt’s O p in ion  provided Canada w ith  n ew  in cen tive  to support the 
concept o f  com pulsory paym ents and, once again, it was Canada, w h o , w ith  a handful 
o f  states, introduced the draft resolution38 in the General A ssem bly w h ich  put the 
A ssem bly on record as accepting the C ourt’s O p in ion .39 •
• In the years that fo llow ed  the passage o f  this resolution there has been a great deal o f  
controversy on the question o f  com pulsory paym ents. It is in teresting to note that the  
experience o f  the U N  in this area has been a m ixed  one. For exam ple, since 1955 o n ly  
one o f  the six  operations carried out— the Uniced N ations O bservation  G roup in  
Lebanon— was financed as a part o f  the regular budget (that is, in  keeping w ith  the 
com pulsory paym ent principle). The paym ents for the other five have been m ade  
from  m ixed sources— the O N U C  and U N E F  w ere financed b y  a com b in ation  o f  
voluntary contributions and com pulsory  assessments. T he U N  T em p orary  E xecutive  
Authoricy and the U N  Y em en  O bservation M ission w ere financed by the parties in  
dispute, and the Cyprus operation  had a unique financing system , that is, a large  
portion o f  the operating cost w as borne by the nations donating troops and the sm all 
rem aining portion was paid from  voluntary donations.40
Canada has responded rem arkably to the post-1962 financial controversy , apparent­
ly alw ays w ith  a v iew  to h e lp in g  the U N  in its efforts to m aintain peace through  
peace-keeping operations, in  the fo llow in g  w ays:
(i) It w aived all its bills for services rendered to the U nited  N ation s in  con n ection  
w ith  the U N E F  peace-keep ing operations it participated in ;41
(ii) O n  a num ber o f  occasions it made voluntary financial con trib u tion s;42
(iii) It lent m on ey  to the U N  b y  purchasing U nited N ations b o n d s;43
(iv) It even agreed to help m ake good  the debts o f  other nations by offering m illion s  
o f  dollars as gifts to the U n ited  N ations.
C O N C L U S I O N
W h at conclusions arc possib le from  the records o f  Canada’s strong financial
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and moral support o f  United N ations peace-keeping activities ? M ost im portantly, 
lends support to the major contention  o f  this article. Canada’s strong interest in 
m aintaining and enhancing the U nited  N ation s’ capacity to perform  its peace-keeping 
operations was equally matched by Canada’s financial and other support. T he strong 
co m m itm en t to the principle o f  com pulsory  paym ents at the establishm ent o f  the 
U N E F , w ithout the realisation that m any nations m ight n o t w an t to g o  along w ith  it, 
caused Canada som e frustration, and a later change o f  p o licy  abandoning this princi­
p le meant som e loss o f  prestige, a sm all price to pay, according to Canadians, for 
attem pting to save the international O rganization  from  possible disintegration.
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APPENDIX E 
INFORMED CONSENT 
The main purpose of this study is to examine decision 
making behaviors. If, at any time during this study, 
you feel uncomfortable or do not wish to continue with 
the study, please feel free to end your participation. 
You will receive you credit and be allowed to leave. 
This study is completely anonymous.
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APPENDIX H 
Regret Rating Scale
After some thought about my decision, I would:
Definitely change my decision. 
Probably change my decision. 
Possibly change my decision. 
Probably not change my decision. 
Definitely not change my decision.
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APPENDIX I 
Confidence Rating Scale 
Please indicate your level of confidence in the 
decision you just made.
I am 10 0% confident that I made the right 
decision.
I am 85% confident that I made the right 
decision.
I am 70% confident that I made the right 
decision.
I am 55% confident that I made the right 
decision.
I am 3 0% confident that I made the right 
decision.
I am 15% confident that I made the right 
decision.
I have no confidence what-so-ever in my 
decision.
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APPENDIX J 
CANDIDATE RATING
1. Dislike credentials of candidate very much
2. Dislike credentials of candidate a little
3. Credentials of candidate don't affect liking one 
way or another
4. Like credentials of candidate a little
5. Like credentials of candidate very much
CANDIDATE A CANDIDATE B CANDIDATE C CANDIDATE D
WHICH CANDIDATE WOULD YOU SUGGEST THE UNIVERSITY HIRE?
CANDIDATE
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APPENDIX K
CANADA'S SUPPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS 
PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS.
Please read the questions and circle the one, best
answer.
1. Peace-keeping efforts in the UN are regarded as:
a. the'duty of all nations involved.
b. an attempt to revitalize the UN.
c. a source of satisfaction of national interest.
d. necessary to the continuing development of the 
individual, national commonwealths.
2. The announcement of June 1965 by Canada regarding 
payment for UNEF and ONUC operations:
a. caused great concern regarding the stability of 
the UN.
b. was a complete reversal of an earlier stated 
policy.
c. allowed the countries the option of bi-annual 
payment.
d. was introduced in an effort to increase 
collection of funds.
3. In fear of causing the Soviet Union, its allies, and 
France to withdraw from the UN and thus cause its 
destruction, Canada:
a. withdrew the requirement of compulsory payment 
for operations.
b. allowed these countries full membership in all 
UN negotiation processes.
c. gave these countries options of payment 
schedules.
d. offered a temporary solution to their financial 
difficulties.
4. When the Secretary-General proposed financing for 
troops and equipment outside the normal budget, 
Canada:
a. believed this would increase the national 
interest of international peace.
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b. believed some nations would refuse to pay.
c. accepted the proposal as the best route for 
financing the effort.
d. refused to accept the proposal.
5. The Canadian Prime Minister strongly felt that the
national payment stipulations:
a. were necessary if the UN were to continue to be 
instrumental in its peace keeping efforts.
b. were too strict in light of the overwhelming 
national debts.
c. should be amended to consider national wealth.
d. were the only means of collecting debts owed to 
the UN for its peace-keeping efforts.
6. The main purpose of this article is to:
a. instruct the reader in the financial developments 
of the UN over the past few decades.
b. submit a new financial proposal of the UN to the 
public.
c. document the support and dissonance of UN members 
in the area of peace keeping.
d. examine the financial aspect of Canadian peace­
keeping policy during crucial changing periods.
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APPENDIX L
COMIC BOOKS - WHAT IS FUNNY?
Please put the page number and strip number of those 
comics that you think are the most funny.
Calvin and Hobbes College Quiz Book
